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Bilingual  education  and  special  education  initially  appear to  be different
solutions to different problems.  Bilingual education  offers instruction to chil-
dren whose primary  language is  not English;  special education offers instruc-
tion  to  children  with  physical  or  emotional  handicaps.  What  the  two
programs share seems quite superficial:  they attend to the needs and interests
of some identifiable subset of the student population, both have sparked polit-
ical controversy, and sometimes  they overlap or deal with the same children.'
At  this  superficial  level,  comparing  the two  programs  hardly  seems  likely  to
reveal anything  that is  not already  apparent about  each  one.
This  article  suggests, however,  that  a comparison  of the programs  yields
important insights into why each one has been controversial and what may be
at stake in the construction and implementation of the programs.  In so doing,
this  article  argues  that  the  two  programs  actually  encounter  the  same
problem,  which  can  be cast as  the question: how  can  schools deal  with  chil-
dren  defined  as  "different"  without  stigmatizing  them  on that  basis?  For a
glimpse  of the shared  problem,  consider  this  curiosity:  during the  past  few
decades, educational  policymakers  switched  allegiance to bilingual programs,
pulling  students  at least  part-time  from  the  mainstream  classroom,  while  at
the  same  time  educators  have  sponsored  special  education  programs  inte-
grating exceptional  students into the mainstream  classroom.  This  changing-
of-the-guard  on integration suggests an initial version of the dilemma encoun-
tered  by  bilingual  and  special  education.  Are the  stigma and  unequal  treat-
ment  encountered  by  minority  groups  better  remedied  by  separation  or  by
integration  of such  groups  with  others?  Either remedy  risks  reinforcing  the
stigma associated with assigned difference by either ignoring it or focusing on
it.  This  double-edged  risk  is  the "difference  dilemma."
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One seeming way  out of the  dilemma would be to focus  on the means  to
achieve  chosen  ends.  On examination,  however,  this route yields  no escape
from the  difference  dilemma.  Constructing measures  to achieve  the ends  of
schooling is  always a  problematic enterprise.  Unintended consequences  and
counterproductive  results  often  occur,  and  a  particular  implementation
problem arises  in response  to the desired  goal  of preventing  the  stigmatiza-
tion of children who are identified  as different  from  the rest of the  students.
In  a  powerful  sense,  the dilemma of difference  reappears  as  decisionmakers
consider whether the school should be structured  to replicate the larger com-
munity  in  terms  of population  mix  and  cultural  mores,  or  instead  should
create  an  enclave  away  from  that  larger  community.  Which  approach,  for
example,  would better  prepare a student  to deal  with  the adult  community?
Which approach would better prepare  a minority group to overcome discrimi-
nation in  the larger community?  Are the ends of schooling better attained  by
designing a microcosm of the world inside the school to give students practice
with  it, or  by designing  different environments  tailored  to  support students
and accommodate  their differences?  This design problem arises  as much for
those who wish to use the schools to preserve existing social arrangements  as
for those who wish to use schools for social change, or for some combination
of these goals.  Whatever position on change and stability educators and par-
ents select, whether the school is more likely to achieve  that position by repli-
cating the larger community  or by serving  as  an enclave  away  from it is  still
open for debate.
2
Another  seeming  way  out of the dilemma  would  address  techniques  for
constraining  the power of the  school  which  may  otherwise  stigmatize  some
children.  Yet  this  approach  also  fails to  escape  the difference  dilemma.  As
programs mandated by law are subject to litigation, bilingual and special edu-
cation expose to scrutiny the nature of the school power deployed to deal with
children who are considered different.  Should the school personnel and pro-
grams assume  a relationship  to students modeled  on  a parent-child  relation-
ship  or  modeled  on  a  state-citizen  relationship?  Different  procedures,
methods,  and directions  in school  programming follow from this  choice, and
different legal frameworks for school activities would also result.  There is no
clear  choice  between  parental  and  state  models  of school  power  given  the
public school's status as both protector and promoter of youth and as a state-
run institution wielding  state power.  In the  context of the dilemma of differ-
ence, addressing the legal shape of school power hardly solves the problem  of
limiting  state  stigmatization  of students;  rather,  it  recasts  the  dilemma  as  a
choice  between  sharply contrasting  but equally  plausible procedural  models.
An examination  of bilingual education and special  education exposes the dif-
ference dilemma and  its recurrence  in decisions  over the means  and ends  of
schooling and the  legal conceptions  of school  power.
2.  This  debate includes  the  issue:  can  the  school be  treated  solely as  a  means, preparing  stu-
dents for the world beyond, or must it also be understood  as itself a community, whether constructed
to resemble the larger  community or assuming a structure and  climate of its own?
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The difference  dilemma and  its  reappearance  in debates  over  means  and
ends  and  over  constraining  school  power  should  not  be  surprising;  these
issues appear  in varied  forms  in  the  history of American  education.  Indeed,
the problems'  very conventional  quality-conventionally  understood  to exist
and  to  resist  resolution-may  dull  our  awareness  of them  and  nonetheless
cabin  debates  over  bilingual  and  special  education.  By  highlighting  the
dilemma of difference  and  its  reappearance  in other forms,  this  article does
not claim  to offer a  solution.  Instead,  it suggests that heightened  awareness
may  permit  a  new  stance  toward  the  dilemma  and  new  approaches  toward
living with it.3  Thus, this article is written with the commitment that self-con-
scious  reflection about  the ways  we  think about our problems  may offer new
possibilities  in  continuing  efforts  to deal  with  those  problems.4  Budgetary
and  bureaucratic  problems  will  not disappear  in  the  face  of new  conceptual
understandings;  however, new attitudes  and strategies  for dealing with these
very problems could emerge. In short, we cannot change our world simply by
thinking about  it differently,  nor can we change it unless  we think  differently
enough  to see  where  we are,  and, with this  sight, act differently.
This article first describes the difference dilemma and its expression within
the  histories,  laws,  and  programs  of bilingual  and  special  education.  The
reoccurrence  of the difference  dilemma in  the problems  of designing educa-
tional programs and constraining school  power is examined next.  Finally, the
article  offers  an  alternative  approach  to  the  difference  dilemma  and  some
examples  of problem-solving  using this  approach.
II
THE  DIFFERENCE  DILEMMA
This nation is committed to both pluralism and equality, yet it also bears a
history of prejudice against people  whom the dominant group  calls different.
Indeed,  differences  in  race,  gender,  and  ethnicity  have  spelled  determinate
positions  on  its  social  hierarchy.  But  nonrecognition  of difference  leaves  in
place a faulty neutrality, constructed so as to advance the dominant group and
hinder  those  who  are  different.  No  wonder  people  caught  in  the dilemma
3.  Cf A. WHEELIS,  How  PEOPLE  CHANGE  17,  100  (1973)  (describing psychotherapy:  therapeutic
insight  does not produce  change but  is  instrumental  to  it;  suffering  does  not disappear  without  a
change  in underlying conflict  which connects  to  changes  in how one  lives, feels,  and  reacts).
4.  See  S.  CAVELL,  PURSUITS  OF  HAPPINESS:  THE  HOLLYWOOD  COMEDY  OF  REMARRIAGE  10-12
(1981)  (describing philosophic commitment  to "being  guided  by our experience  but not dictated to
by  it"  and  "to  educate  your experience  sufficiently  that it is  worthy of trust");  R.  HOWARD,  THREE
FACES  OF HERMENEUTICS  (1982)  (philosophic traditions converging  in study of knowledge and delib-
erate efforts  to  uncover role  of the interpreter in interpretation); J. SARTRE,  SEARCH  FOR  A  METHOD
180  (H.  Barnes  trans.  2d  ed.  1968)  (freedom  grasped  as  condition  of human  limits  through  self
knowledge).  See generally R.  RIEFF,  FELLOW  TEACHERS  23  (1973)  (psychotherapy  as "the social  proce-
dure  of release  from  the authority of the past"  but  not rejecting the pre-existing world);  P. RIEFF,
FREUD:  THE  MIND  OF  THE  MORALIST  65-101  (1975)  (psychoanalytic  uncovering of the hidden  self
bearing some relationship  to freedom); Taylor, Interpretation  and the Science of Man, in KNOWLEDGE  AND
VALUES  IN  SOCIAL  AND  EDUCATIONAL  RESEARCH  153,  177-78  (E.  Bredo  & W.  Feinberg  eds.  1982)
(interpretation  searches  for  subjective  and  shared  meanings);  A.  WHEELIS,  supra note  3,  at  113
(freedom depends  on awareness  but  does not  necessarily  follow  awareness).
Page  157: Spring  1985]LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
experience  an impossibility of movement,  for movement in any direction cre-
ates  risks of recreating  the dilemma.
Identification or acknowledgment of a trait of difference,  associated by the
dominant group with minority identity, risks recreating occasions for majority
discrimination  based on that trait.  Nonidentification  or nonacknowledgment,
• however,  risks recreating occasions  for discrimination based on majority prac-
tices,  such  as  tests, norms,  and judgments  forged without  regard  for differ-
ence,  or with  regard  solely  for  the  perspective,  needs,  and  interests  of the
dominant  group.  Because  minority  differences  have  been  made  to  carry
implications for a person's worth and status a minority member may be reluc-
tant to expose or emphasize such difference.  Yet nonexposure can subject the
minority  to evaluation  by  allegedly neutral criteria  that in  fact implement the
majority  values  and view.
Similarly,  separation or segregation  of a minority  group  risks  promoting
distrust and misunderstandings  based  on group  differences,  and yet integra-
tion risks perpetuating chafing expressions of hostility between dominant  and
minority  groups.  Separation  reinforces  stigma and  feelings  of inferiority  by
the  group  historically  encountering  discrimination.  Separation  may  also
permit  inequalities  in  resources  as  the  majority  allocates  differentially  to
minority groups,  sharing with itself its  special access to resources  and leaving
the  minority  to struggle  with less.  Separation  in the  short run may promote
the association  of difference with inferiority by perpetuating group misunder-
standings, minority feelings  of inferiority, and majority feelings of superiority.
Yet  integration  also  risks  perpetuating  hierarchy.  It  may  deny  minority
members  a  safe place to develop  themselves  by  isolating them as  individuals
amid the dominant group.  By depriving minority group members of opportu-
nities to  develop  group identity and  strength, integration  can  imply  or rein-
force the inferiority of that minority identity.  Patterns  of difference are set in
motion  by  inequalities  of experience,  of access  to  resources,  and  of self-
esteem upon entry into the integrated setting, while the commitment to avoid
reiterating difference  in  that setting can leave  these patterns  in  place.  A his-
tory  of assigned  difference  and  infirmity  can  be  frozen,  then,  by  a  current
commitment to stop assigning  difference;  both focusing  on and ignoring  dif-
ference  risk recreating  it.  This is  the  dilemma of difference.
The dilemma is not  i model nor a theoretical scheme, but a felt experience
and  pattern  of social  practice.  This  rather  stark  statement  of the  dilemma
needs shading and context.  The example of race and schooling helps ground
the difference dilemma and helps locate it in a context more familiar to many
than the subjects  of bilingual and special  education, to which  the article  then
turns.
A.  The Example  of Racial  Desegregation
The dilemma of difference should be i'aiiiliar  to students of the civil rights
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separation of the races  itself carried  no stigma.' 2
The  NAACP in  large  measure took the  Court at  its word  and challenged
the  equality  of separate  facilities  rather  than  the  principle  of separate  but
equal.  The  litigation  strategy  conducted  by  the  NAACP  thus  started  with
graduate  level  public  universities  and colleges,  where  separate  facilities  for
blacks  were either nonexistent or a sham.  A string of victories required inte-
gration of law schools where no state supported legal education was  available
for blacks, 13 integration  of law  schools where  separate (but tangibly  inferior)
legal  education  was  provided  for  blacks, 14  and  integration  of  graduate
schools. 15  Then the NAACP  turned to the  elementary  schools with the same
argument  that  the  facilities  for  blacks  are  unequal.  But  the  NAACP  also
hoped  to  assault  at this  point the  "separate  but equal"  principle itself.  The
NAACP  lawyers  took  advantage  of evolving  social  science  teachings  which
attacked  traditional  theories  of racial  victimization,  and  worked  with  social
psychologist  Kenneth  Clark  who  developed  studies  of the low-self image  of
black  children.' 6  Social  science  data  became  the  basis for  the  controversial
footnote  11  in Brown  which  was  used  to  bolster  the  Court's  reasoning  that
segregated  education  undermined  the  black  child's  self-esteem  and  motiva-
tion  to  learn,  and  its  conclusion  that,  in  the  field  of  public  education,
"[s]eparate  education  facilities  are  inherently unequal."17
The  social  science  basis  for  this  conclusion  immediately  triggered
debate,'  and  the  desegregation  remedies  produced  frustration  and  disap-
pointment  with  the supposed  link  between  integration  and  equality.  White
resistance  in the  form of violence,  white flight,  and continued  stigmatization
of blacks in integrated schools made segregation no longer the obvious  target.
Resenting their continued  degradation  and powerlessness,  a  new generation
of black  leaders  started  the Black  Power movement  and  favored  community
control  of local,  segregated  schools.  They  vocally  rejected  assimilation  as  a
threat  to  black culture and  black  self-consciousness  and  sought to raise  their
group  status through self-governance. 19
Courts  and  scholars  soon  sensed  these demands  for  community  control
and developed  new schemes  to remedy  race discrimination  with an emphasis
on  black  empowerment  and  redistributed  authority  over  schooling.  The
Atlanta  Plan,  often  cited  as a  model, emphasized  the hiring  of blacks  to  fill
administrative  posts in  the school system-including  the job of the  superin-
12.  See id. at 551-52.
13.  See,  e.g.,  Missouri ex  rel. Gaines  v.  Canada,  305 U.S.  337  (1938).
14.  Sweatt  v. Painter, 339 U.S.  629  (1950).
15.  McLaurin  v. Oklahoma  State Regents  for Higher Educ.,  339 U.S.  637  (1950).
16.  See R.  KLUGER,  supra note  7,  at 3 15-45.
17.  Brown  v.  Board of Educ.,  347  U.S. 483, 494-95  nn.10-11  (1954).
18.  See, e.g.,  Cahn,Jurisprudence,  30 N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  150,  153-54  (1955);  Honnold,  Book  Review,
33 IND.  L.J.  612,  614-15  (1958).
19.  Ravitch,  The Evolution of School Desegregation  Policy, 1964-1979, in  RACE  AND SCHOOLING  IN  THE
CITY  9,  15  (1981);  see  also  R.  BLUMBERG,  CIVIL  RIGHTS:  THE  1960's  FREEDOM  STRUGGLE  117-37
(1984)  (Black  Power movement).
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tendent.20  Scholars  like Derrick A.  Bell, Jr. campaigned  for judicial remedies
addressing the quality of education  rather  than racial  integration. 21
Kenneth Clark reflected on these developments  and warned that:
[Community  control]  may further isolate  the poor and the minority groups  from the
majority society and  bring the customary consequences  of racial and class isolation-
eroded  facilities,  inadequate  teaching  and  administrative  staffs,  and  minimum
resources ...
Community control,  therefore, requires a commitment of the city as a  whole,  gen-
uine delegation of power, and continued  efforts to relate  the community to  the larger
society.  Perhaps  paradoxically,  the  lower-status  community  will  never  have  genuine
power  until its isolation  is  ended.
22
The  paradox,  indeed,  expresses  the  dilemma  of  difference:  continued
powerlessness for blacks could emerge from even self-chosen segregation, but
powerlessness  could also  emerge  from  efforts to  integrate with a  larger com-
munity  still  assigning  a  lower  status  to  blacks.  Separation  might permit  the
assertion of minority group identity and strength, but without acceptance  and
empowerment  by  the majority,  the minority  will continue  to  suffer from  the
associations  between  racial difference  and social  and political status.
This  dilemma  which arises  in  the  treatment  of racial  difference  was  not,
however,  a new discovery  in  the post-Brown era.  W.E.B.  Dubois  and  Booker
T. Washington  had  carried  on  a  similar  debate  more  than  half  a  century
before.  In particular  they debated  the issue of whether reform efforts  should
seek to integrate blacks within the ideology and social patterns created by the
dominant  culture  or  should attempt  to  alter that  culture  by  celebrating  the
separate heritage and culture of the minority group.23  Each position received
periodic acclaim followed by blame as a cause of continuing racial oppression.
Debate over these positions etched the shape of the difference dilemma.  Con-
tinued  attachment  to  a  separate  racial  identity-complete  with  separate
schools and cultural socialization-could  perpetuate rather than alter the his-
toric  degradation  of blacks;  integration  aimed  at  assimilation  could  do  the
same  or  even  accentuate  black  student  difference  without  equipping  them
with a supporting  community  backed  by their  own parents.
Assimilation continues  to be criticized  as either impossible or undesirable;
20.  See Jackson,  Urban School Desegregation  from a Black Perspective, in  RACE  AND  SCHOOLING  IN  THE
CITY  204, 209-11  (1981).
21.  See  Bell, Brown  v. Board  of Education and the Interest-Convergence  Dilemma, 93  HARV.  L. REV.
518 (1980); Bell,  Waiting on the Promise of Brown,  LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Spring 1975, at 341; see also
Bell, Serving Two  Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85  YALE
L.J.  470  (1976)  (describing black  opposition  to school busing  plans  and  criticizing  public  interest
lawyers for  failing  to recognize  minority  group desires).  See generally Hawley,  The  New-Mythology  of
School Desegregation, LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn  1978, at 214 (criticizing scholarly disenchant-
ment with  desegregation).
22.  Clark, Introduction to  M.  FANTINI,  M.  GrITELL & R.  MAGAT,  supra note  8, at xi.
23.  See  M.  CURTI,  THE  SOCIAL  IDEAS  OF  AMERICAN  EDUCATORS  288-309  (1959)  (comparing
Washington  and Dubois);  R.  KLUGER,  supra note  7,  at  91-100  (same);  see also W.E.B.  DUBOlS,  THE
SOULS  OF  BLACK  FOLK  (1916)  (describing  richness  of black  heritage  deserving  preservation);  B.
WASHINGTON,  Up  FROM  SLAVERY  (1970)  (describing his own education  and conception of education
for blacks).
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attributed differences continue to stigmatize.  As one black parent told a white
psychologist  in  the  1970's:
The goal,  I  think, is not that people have  to get to  the point of being colorblind.  No
one needs  to  tell me you're white,  and no one  needs  to  tell you I'm black.  . . . The
goal is  simpler than  that.  You get to  know our  family, we  get to know  you and your
family.  That  they  aren't  equal,  well, that's  what we're  all going  to have  to live  with.
Maybe  together we'll  change it.
2 4
Ignoring  differences  could  reproduce  them,  even  when  well-intentioned
people  prescribe reforms.  The prospect of learning new ways  to live with the
experience  of difference may  be what study  of the dilemma  offers.
B.  Bilingual  Education  and Special  Education:  Historical Preoccupations
with Difference
Historically,  school  programs  for  children  who  are  not  native  English
speakers  have  sometimes  ignored  their  difference,  but  more  recently  they
have emphasized  it.  Historically, school programs for children with handicaps
have  sometimes  emphasized  their  differences,  but  more  recently  they  have
emphasized  their  similarities.  Both  types  of programs  continue  to struggle
with  the dilemma  of difference.  A brief review  of the  histories of these pro-
grams, 25  followed  by an  examination  of their legal and  programmatic  struc-
tures,  demonstrates  this preoccupation.
1.  Bilingual Education.  Educators,  lawyers,  and historians frequently  depict
the  history  of bilingual  education  as  a  political  struggle  ultimately  yielding
recognition of native language  as an important differentiating characteristic of
students-a  characteristic  deserving  accommodation  by  the  public  schools.
This history begins with  the presentation of this nation as  a country peopled
by immigrants  who supplanted  the language  and  culture of indigenous  peo-
ples.  English  became  the  dominant  language  in  this  country's  public  life.
English  is  the  language  of the  legislatures  and courts,  the  marketplace,  and
the public schools. 26
The  supplanting  of languages  other than  English  in  the  schools did  not,
however, go uncontested.  Subcommunities  which maintained  the language of
their  home  country  through  local  newspapers,  cultural  entertainment,  and
religious  activities  periodically  pushed for recognition  of their language  and
culture within  the schools.  Indeed, in  some pockets,  politically sophisticated
immigrants  successfully  elected  school  boards  which  in  turn  implemented
bilingual educational  programs, preserving  the ethnic language  of the group
while also instructing the children  in English. 27  Opposition to the use of for-
24.  T.  COTTLE,  BLACK  CHILDREN,  WHITE  DREAMS  53  (1974).
25.  This  synthesis  of the  histories  offered  in textbooks  and  monographs  does not  attempt  to
uncover competing versions  of the historical events that future scholarship  may develop in response
to shifting political attitudes  about the programs.
26.  See Edelman, Basic American, 6 NOLPE SCH.  L.J. 83,  88 & n.47  (1976)  (majority of states have
statutes requiring English  to be  primarily used in the public schools and allowing foreign languages
to be  used  only  to aid  in  the mastery of English)  (listing  statutes).
27.  D. TYACK, THE ONE BEST  SYSTEM  106-09  (1974)  (discussing German programs in Cincinnati
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eign  languages  in the  schools,  however,  mounted;  this sentiment  motivated
the  enactment  of statutes  forbidding  the  teaching  of any  non-English  lan-
guage even in a private school to students below the eighth grade.  One Court
ruled that such  a statute violated  the  Constitution's  guarantee  of liberty and
due  process.  In  Meyer  v.  Nebraska,  even  though  the  Court  recognized  the
state's  power  to  "foster  a  homogeneous  people  with  American  ideals,  pre-
pared readily  to understand  current  discussions  of civic  matters,"  the Court
concluded that the legislative means selected violated the Constitution.28  The
decision  in Meyer,  then, became  an important milestone  in  the nation's  com-
mitment  to pluralism-but  that decision  did not  place foreign  languages  on
an  equal  footing  with  English.  Nor  did  it  entitle  children  to  instruction  in
foreign  language;  it  simply  forbade  rules  proscribing  such  instruction.  The
case stands in the history of bilingual education as a reminder of longstanding
local  struggles  over non-English instruction, marked  by escalating opposition
in  the  name of patriotism  during wartime. 29
Instruction in languages other than English became unpopular during and
after the First World War, except as elective courses for students already pro-
ficient in  English.A 0  Developments  after World War II  paved the  way  for the
instruction  in  their  mother  tongue  for  children  not  proficient  in  English;
mounting immigration, Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, and the
civil  rights  movement  all  supplied  bases  for  compensatory  educational  pro-
grams, including instruction for students whose native language was not Eng-
lish.3 1  Ethnic pride movements  figured importantly in the  call for combining
language  instruction with cultural awareness  programs.  The history of bilin-
gual  education  usually  concludes  with  a  comparison  of the  experiences  of
immigrants  who,  earlier  in  the nation's history,  had  to or chose  to abandon
their ethnic heritage  in contrast  to contemporary groups who reject homoge-
nization and nurture cultural difference.
This  frequently  depicted  history  of bilingual  education  is  a  story  of the
growing recognition of language and cultural differences and of the harm chil-
dren  experienced  when  such  differences  were  not  recognized.  This  story,
then, manifests  one half of the  difference  dilemma:  nonacknowledgment  of
difference reiterates  difference, given a social world making difference matter.
Leonard  Covello,  the  first  New  York  City  public  school  principal  of Italian
and  St.  Louis,  1840-1890).  See  generally  H.  KLOSS,  THE  AMERICAN  BILINGUAL  TRADITION  (1977)
(describing bilingual  patterns  in the  19th  century).
28.  262  U.S.  390,  402  (1923).
29.  See, e.g.,  Wagner, The Historical  Background of Bilingualism  and Biculturalism  in the United States, in
THE  NEW  BILINGUALISM:  AN  AMERICAN  DILEMMA  29,  42  (M.  Ridge  ed.  1981)  ("We cannot  tolerate
any  attempt  to oppose  or supplant  the  language  and  culture  that has  come  down  to us  from  the
builders of this  republic with  the language  and culture of any  European country.  The greatness  of
this  nation  depends  on the swift  assimilation of the aliens she welcomes  to her  shores.")  (quoting
Theodore Roosevelt).
30.  T.  ANDERSON  & M.  BOYER,  BILINGUAL  SCHOOLING  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  21-22  (2d  ed.
1978);  P.  CAFFERTY  & C.  RIVERA-MARTINEZ,  THE POLITICS OF  LANGUAGE:  THE  DILEMMA  OF  BILINGUAL
EDUCATION  FOR  PUERTO  RICANS  4,  14-15  (1981).
31.  See  Bilingual  Education  Act,  Pub.  L.  No. 90-247,  tit.  VII,  §§  701-708,  81  Stat.  783  (1968)
(current version  at 20  U.S.C.  §§  3221-3261  (1982)).
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heritage,  recalled  his  experience  in  the  public  schools  at  the  turn  of  the
century:
During  this  period  the  Italian  language  was  completely  ignored  in  the  American
schools.  In  fact, throughout my  whole  elementary school  career,  I  do not recall  one
mention  of Italy or the Italian language or what famous Italians had done in the world,
with  the possible  exception  of Columbus.  . . . We soon  got  the  idea that  "Italian"
meant something inferior,  and a barrier was erected between  children of Italian origin
and  their  parents.  This  was  the  accepted  process  of  Americanization.  We  were
becoming Americans  by learning how  to be ashamed  of our parents.
32
Advocates  of bilingual  education  link  this  shame  about  family,  ethnicity,
and ultimately  self, to  the poor academic  achievement  of many  children  for
whom  English  is  a second  language.  The advocates  contend  that it  is  worse
than cruel,  in fact  it  is  devastating  to  a  child's  self-respect,  when  a  child  is
forced  to give  up a family language  while  attending school.  This  denigrates
not only the mother tongue but also  the value system of the home culture.  It
is little wonder  such children do poorly in school.  Educating children  in part
in  the  language  of their homes-at  least  until  they  have  mastered it-is  as
important  as learning  English.  This,  it is  argued,  will create  a  spirit of self-
respect and self-confidence  in  students.33
Author Richard  Rodriguez  offered  a  different  assessment  of his parochial
school  education, where  his native Spanish  was not used or acknowledged:
Without  question,  it  would  have  pleased  me  to  hear  my  teachers  address  me  in
Spanish when  I  entered  the  classroom.  I  would  have  felt  much  less  afraid.  I would
have trusted them and responded with  ease.  But I would have delayed-for how long
postponed?-having  to  learn the language  of public  society.  I would  have evaded-
and for how long could  I have afforded to delay?-learning  the great lesson of school,
that I had a public identity.  And, [w]hat I needed  to learn in school was that I had the
right-and  the obligation-to  speak the  public language  of los gringos. 
3 4
Here then is the other side of the dilemma; acknowledgment  of difference  can
create  barriers  to  important  aspects  of the  school  experience  and  delay  or
derail successful  entry into the society that continues  to make that difference
matter.  Both sides of the dilemma  appear and reappear in the history of edu-
cation  for students  who are not native English  speakers.
2.  Special Education.  A  contrasting  history  appears  for  education  for  the
handicapped, but here, too, the dilemma of difference appears and reappears.
As  frequently  told, this history  emphasizes  the exclusion  of exceptional  chil-
32.  SILBERMAN,  CRISIS  IN  THE  CLASSROOM  58  (1970)  (quoting Leonard Covello).
33.  Ridge,  The New  Bilingualism: An American Dilemma, in THE  NEW  BILINGUALISM:  AN  AMERICAN
DILEMMA  259,  260  (M.  Ridge ed.  1981).  A  Hispanic  school administrator  explained,  "You  tell the
child:  'Your language is second-rate and you shouldn't speak it.  Your culture is second-rate and you
need to  be something  else.  . . .'  What you  are in fact  saying  to  the kids  is  'You  are second-rate.'  "
Lanier,  Teaching with  Subtitles, CHI.  MAG.  at  163,  191  (June  1984)  (quoting Jose  Gonzales,  Associate
Superintendant of Chicago  Board  of Education).
34.  R.  RODRIGUEZ,  HUNGER  OF  MEMORY:  THE  EDUCATION  OF  RICHARD  RODRIQUEZ  19  (1982)
(emphasis  in original).  Even though  they  differ in  their views on  bilingual  education, both Covello
and  Rodriguez  understand  schooling  as  a  process  of  transferring  loyalties  and  transforming
identities.
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dren from  mainstream  classrooms  or  from schooling altogether.3 5  This  his-
tory  is  complicated  by  the  broad,  ambiguous,  and  shifting  conception  of
handicap;  exceptional children  can include children with developmental  disa-
bilities,  emotional  disturbances,  learning  or  perceptual  disabilities,  sensory
deficits,  mobility  impairments,  and  each  of these  definitional  categories  has
shifted over time.  Nonetheless,  a general historical picture of the educational
opportunities for exceptional children depicts the gradual but steady progress
toward recognizing what these children share with other children, rather than
emphasizing their differences.  It is thus a story of expanding humanitarianism
and increasing  inclusion of handicapped  children  in the worlds  of education,
training, and  social life.
The  story begins before schooling was compulsory, when local authorities
had  discretion  to  exclude  children  from public education  on the  grounds  of
ineducability,  and  communities  tended  to  consider handicaps  as  barriers  to
adult  responsibilities.  As  a  result,  until the  Civil War,  children  with  special
needs were usually hidden in poorhouses.  Humanitarian reforms, led by phy-
sicians  in both Europe and the United States, produced special institutions for
the deaf and  for the blind  during  the early part of the  nineteenth century.3 6
Local  policies  segregated  the  disabled  in  institutions  removed  from  the
community.
3 7
After the  Civil War, as many  communities adopted  compulsory education
laws and  then began  to enforce them, exceptional  children began  to present
themselves  in  increasing  numbers  to  public  schools.  Educators  responded
with  separate  day  schools-and  separate  classes within  existing schools-for
the  deaf, the  mentally  retarded,  the  crippled,  and other  groups  of children
identified with the handicap labels of that time.  Previously consigned to insti-
tutions  or locked away at home, during this later period children with special
needs at least  had a place,  and a chance  for some  education  and attention.38
Some recent versions of this history emphasize the interaction between prolif-
erating separate  classes  for special children  and the influx of new immigrants
to  the  community  and  the  community  schools.39  This  isolation  of minority
groups  in special  education classes  drew attention  to the similarities  between
special  education  and  education  segregated  by  race  or  ethnicity. 40  At  the
35.  See,  e.g.,  Stark,  Tragic Choices in Special Education:  The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementa-
tion of Pub. L.  No. 94-142, 14  CONN.  L.  REV.  477,  479-80  (1982).
36.  Reformers  established  in  Hartford,  Connecticut,  a  residential  institution  offering  training
and a protective environment for the deaf in 1817.  Schools for the blind were established around  the
same  era;  by  the time of the  Civil  War,  such  institutions  were common.  S.  KIRK  & J. GALLAGHER,
EDUCATING  EXCEPTIONAL  CHILDREN  4-5  (3d ed.  1979).
37.  F.  HEWETT  & S.  FORNESS,  EDUCATION  OF  EXCEPTIONAL  LEARNERS  32-41  (1974).
38.  E.g.,  S.  SARASON  &J. DORIS,  EDUCATIONAL  HANDICAP,  PUBLIC  POLICY,  AND  SOCIAL  HISTORY
232  (1978);  Cruickshank, The Development of Education  for Exceptional Children, in EDUCATION  OF EXCEP-
TIONAL  CHILDREN  AND  YOUTH  11-12  (W.  Cruickshank  & P.  Xurland  3d ed.  1975);  Tyack,  Ways of
Seeing:  An  Essay in the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46  HARV.  EDUC.  REV.  355  (1976).
39.  S.  SARASON  &J.  DORIS,  supra note  38, at  245.
40.  See Hobson  v.  Hansen, 269 F.  Supp. 401  (D.D.C.  1967),  affd sub nom.  Smuck  v.  Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.  1969) (en banc); Larry P. v. Riles,  343 F. Supp.  1306,  1309 (N.D.  Cal. 1972),  afd,
502 F.2d 963  (9th Cir.  1974).
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same time,  social scientists uncovered  the psychological  detriment  to a  child
from being labeled as different and inferior.4 1 The harmful effects of separate
treatment  became  the  focus  of the  culminating  chapter  in  this  story  of the
progressive  inclusion of handicapped  children.
During the  1970's, law  reformers  pushed for both expanding the services
for  special  education  and  educating  the  exceptional  child  with  his  or  her
"normal peers  to whatever extent  is  compatible  with potential for the fullest
development. '42  Two  landmark  federal district  court cases  produced  stipu-
lated relief to this effect,43  and state and federal legislation between  1970 and
1978  incorporated these mainstreaming  goals. 44  What happened  during the
intervening  decades  to  yield  this  trend  toward  integrating  or  "main-
streaming"  exceptional children?  Building on the civil rights  movement  and
Brown v.  Board of Education,45 educational  reformers  sensitized  the legal  com-
munity to  the stigma  of separate  treatment,  the risks of misclassification  and
labeling  in  creating stigma and low self-esteem, and  the abusive use of sepa-
rate  classes  to  perpetuate  discrimination  against  racial  and  ethnic  minori-
ties. 46  Legal  reformers  in  turn  adopted  a  due  process  tack  to  promote
accountability  by  public  decisionmakers  and individualized  consideration  of
students, just as  the due process  doctrine  had  previously been  used to  help
recipients  of public benefits.  In  the special  education context,  litigators  and
legislators  used  the due process  doctrines  to structure  procedural  and  sub-
stantive protections for handicapped children who were excluded from public
schooling.47  These legal frameworks  provided a rhetoric for treating excep-
41.  Stigma from segregation, of course,  emerged as  a psychological  detriment in the context of
racial  desegregation.  See  Brown  v.  Board  of Educ.,  347 U.S.  483, 494  n.1 1 (1954).  But cf  Levin  &
Moise,  School Desegregation Litigation in  the Seventies  and the  Use of Social Science Evidence:  An Annotated
Guide,  LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Winter  1975,  at 50,  53-56 (since Brown, courts  have questioned use
of social  science research in regard  to the question of whether a constitutional violation ocurred, but
have  used  them to fashion remedies);  Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn  1978, at  57,  69-71
(noting limitations of social science methodology applied in Brown v. Board of Educ.).  The relation-
ship between handicap labeling and stigma became a major issue in social services  during the 1970's.
See J.  MERCER,  LABELING  THE  MENTALLY  RETARDED:  CLINICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SYSTEM  PERSPECTIVES  ON
MENTAL  RETARDATION  31,  82  (1973)  (service  providers  should be  aware of links between  social  sys-
tems,  status, and handicap  labels); J. SHRYBMAN,  DUE  PROCESS  IN  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  6 (1982)  (due
process concerns  about  reputational interest  threatened  by labeling).
42.  S.  KIRK &J. GALLAGHER,  EDUCATING  EXCEPTIONAL  CHILDREN  7 (1979).
43.  Mills  v.  Board of Educ.,  348 F. Supp.  866 (D.D.C.  1972)  (court-ordered  remedy, including
order for comprehensive  plan by defendants);  Pennsylvania Ass'n  for Retarded  Children  (PARC) v.
Pennsylvania,  343  F.  Supp.  279  (E.D.  Pa.  1972)  (consent agreement).
44.  See  Zettel & Abeson,  The Right to  a Free Appropriate  Public Education, in THE  COURTS  AND  EDU-
CATION  188,  198-99  (C.  Hooker ed.  1978)  (77th Yearbook of the  National Society  for the  Study  of
Education)  (describing legislative  developments).
45.  347  U.S. 483  (1954).
46.  Hobson v.  Hansen,  269  F. Supp.  401  (D.D.C.  1967),  afd sub nom.  Smuck  v.  Hobson, 408
F.2d  175 (D.C. Cir.  1969) (en banc)  (illicit use of tracking  to perpetuate racial  segregation); see, e.g.,
Kirp,  Buss,  & Kuriloff, Legal Reform  of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural  Proposals, 62
CALIF.  L.  REV.  40, 46 (1974)  (misclassification).
47.  See  Pennsylvania  Ass'n  for Retarded  Children  (PARC)  v.  Pennsylvania,  334 F.  Supp.  1257
(E.D.  Pa.  1971)  (per curiam)  (injunction and consent agreement),  343  F.  Supp. 279 (E.D.  Pa.  1972)
(injunction  and  amended  consent  agreement);  Mills  v.  Board  of Educ.  348  F.  Supp.  866  (D.D.C.
1972).
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tional children as, first and foremost, persons entitled to legal and educational
rights.  The rhetoric could also advance  their inclusion,  at least conceptually,
in the  larger community.
The history of special education  thus depicts increasing faith in the educa-
bility of special  needs  children and growing commitment to grant them entry
to the social life  of other children.  Yet the dilemma of difference recurs.  On
the  one  hand,  ever  more  sophisticated  methods  to  recognize  varieties  of
handicapping  conditions  identify  increasing numbers  of children  as different
and  therefore  entitled  to  some  specialized  instruction.  On  the  other hand,
increasing  commitment to treat special needs children like other children cau-
tions against  this  very  result,  or argues  for  creating  facsimiles  of the  main-
stream classroom in special schools  or in classes  for those with special needs.
Making  difference  matter  recreates  difference  and  its associated  hierarchy  of
status;  making  difference  not  matter,  though,  may  cause  the  same  result.
Even  given  their  contrasting  histories,  both  bilingual  and  special  education
highlight  this dilemma.
C.  Legal  and Programmatic  Structures
As  a result  of federal  and state  litigation  and legislation  during  the  past
several  decades,  a welter of legal  authorities  have emerged  to construct  and
define  the  programs  known  as  bilingual  and  special  education.  In addition,
competing  program  types  have  emerged  in  both  areas.  These  legal  and
programmatic  structures  share complexity,  but diverge  in shape and content.
Nonetheless,  the  underlying  difference  dilemma  can  help  explain  points  of
confusion  and  contention in  these programmatic  structures.
1.  Bilingual Education: Legal Framework and the Difference Dilemma.  When the
Supreme Court decided Lau v. Nichols48 in  1974, it accepted the claim of non-
English  speaking  Chinese students  that  instruction  solely  in  English  denied
them  "a  meaningful  opportunity  to participate  in the educational  program,"
and it construed Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to supply a legal basis
for demanding  special  instruction for language  minority  students  in  schools
receiving  federal  financial  assistance.  The  Court  thereby  linked  affirmative
obligations  to provide language instruction  to the statutory requirement  that
"[n]o  person  in  the  United  States  shall,  on  the  ground  of race,  color,  or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be
subjected  to  discrimination  under any  program or activity  receiving  Federal
financial  assistance. ''49  The  Court  refrained,  however,  from  detailing  the
form such language  instruction must or should take.  Indeed, the Court noted
that no particular remedy was requested by the plaintiffs:  "[tleaching  English
to  the  students  of Chinese ancestry  who  do  not  speak  the  language  is  one
choice.  Giving instruction to this group in Chinese is another.  There may be
48.  414 U.S.  563 (1974).
49.  Title VI  of the Civil  Rights Act of 1964, 42  U.S.C.  § 2000d  (1982).
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others."
50
It could  be argued  that  anything but immersion  in  the  mainstream  class-
room  violates  the  plain language  of Title  VI;  what  made  Lau an  impressive
decision  was  the Court's recognition of an experiential context in which  such
mainstreaming, with no attention  to language and cultural  differences,  consti-
tuted, for the Chinese-speaking  plaintiffs, exclusion,  denied benefits  and  dis-
crimination.  In this respect,  the Lau decision  resembles  the Court's opinion
in Loving v.  Virginia,"i where  the social  meaning  of majority-minority  differ-
ences  was  a  factor in  the Court's  rejection  of a miscegenation  statute.  The
Court  concluded that although the miscegenation  law  equally forbade blacks
and  whites  from marrying each  other, in the context of a  national history  of
discrimination  against nonwhites,  this  law  reinforced  the  stigma  against  the
minority race and thus unconstitutionally  discriminated.  In Loving, a straight-
forward  legal  rejection  of the miscegenation  statute  did not recreate  the dif-
ference  dilemma in the construction  of a legal remedy, 52 yet the Lau decision
could not avoid this dilemma in developing legal alternatives.  State decisions
remain  to  be  made  about  how  to  treat  minority  language  children  in  the
public  schools.  The  generality  of the  language  adopted  in  the  Civil  Rights
Act-undoubtedly without the Lau problem  in mind-is commodious enough
to support contrasting remedial  alternatives, any  of which may  well continue
to stigmatize  the children who are different.  The dilemma of difference, then,
remains for decisions  based on the reasoning  of Lau.
The  second legal framework for bilingual education,  the  Bilingual Educa-
tion  Act,  as  amended  by  the  Equal  Educational  Opportunity  Act, 53  also
presents the difference  dilemma.  The Bilingual Education Act acknowledges
the  need  for  both  English  language  and  native  language  instruction,  but
obscures the critical choice  between integration and segregation and between
English  usage  and  native  language  usage  by  directing  that  the  mix  of lan-
guages  "shall,  to  the extent necessary,  be in all courses  or subjects  of study
which  will  allow  a  child  to  progress  effectively  through  the  educational
50.  414  U.S.  at 564-65.
51.  388 U.S.  1 (1967).
52.  The  Court  in  Loving  did  not  need  to  craft  a  new  law;  it just  struck  down  the  law  under
challenge.  Yet  even  though  the  Court  could  escape  the  difference  dilemma,  eliminating  the  law
against  miscegenation  hardly  eliminates  the  difference  dilemma  for  an  interracial  couple  contem-
plating marriage in some contemporary  American communities.  Their marriage, premised on  their
belief that their racial  differences should not matter, may expose both them and their children to the
risks of stigma.  Cf  Palmore  v.  Sidoti,  426 So.  2d  34  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct. App.  1982)  (affirming without
opinion trial court's  holding  that change  of custody for white daughter was  warranted where  white
mother married black man since children  of interracial  marriage would  be stigmatized),  rev 'd, 104 S.
Ct.  1879 (1984)  (acknowledging  risks to the child  from custody  with interracial  couple but rejecting
this  as  basis for  state imposed change  in  custody).  However,  a decision  on their part not to marry
surely just  as  much reconfirms  the  stigmatizing,  discriminatory  dimensions  of difference  as  it  has
come to have social  meaning.  See  also M.P.  v.  S.P.,  169  N.J.  Super. 425, 438,  404 A.2d  1256,  1263
(1979)  (judge explains  that removing  children from custody of lesbian mother to protect  them from
community  disapproval  would  teach  them  to  leave  their problems  and  to  believe  that loved  ones
should be  abandoned if others dislike them).
53.  20  U.S.C.  §§ 3221-3261  (1982).
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system." 54  The  critical  choices,  then,  are  to  be  resolved  with  reference  to
undefined  terms  such  as  "to  the  extent  necessary,"  and  "to  progress  effec-
tively through  the educational  system"-where  the  meanings of "necessary"
and  "effective  progress"  may  be themselves  changed  by  the  introduction  of
bilingual education.  Similarly,  the Equal Educational Opportunity Act leaves
critical  terms  undefined  and  thereby  preserves  the  difference  dilemma;
depending  on terms  like  "appropriate,"  and  "equal  participation,- 55  the Act
preserves  the dilemma about whether to avoid discrimination  by constructing
special and separate programs or by pushing the different child into participa-
tion in  the mainstream  class.
2.  Bilingual Programs and the Difference Dilemma.  In  the  face of this  remedial
ambiguity,  federal  courts  and  agencies  developed  a  range  of possible  pro-
grams.  As  implemented  by  local  school  boards and  school staff, varied  pro-
grams  abound.56  Grouping  the programs  into two  major kinds of programs
can serve to highlight this variety and also to underscore the continuing reme-
dial ambiguity  in  legal  developments  since Lau.
a.  Types of Bilingual Programs.  The first type of program, called "English  as a
Second Language Instruction"  (ESL), has been defined by the federal  govern-
ment as "[a]  structured language acquisition program designed to teach Eng-
lish  to  students  whose  native  language  is  not  English." 57  Typically,  ESL
provides intensive instruction in English, with the goal of enabling the student
to speak  and understand  English  as  soon  as possible, and employs  the "pull
out"  method:  the language minority student spends most of the school day in
the regular class  without language assistance, and the student is pulled out of
the  mainstream  class  during  part  of the  day  for  ESL instruction.  ESL  does
not,  then, use native  language  instruction  to  conduct substantive  classes  in,
say,  math or  social  studies,  while  the student  is  gaining  mastery  of English;
54.  20  U.S.C.  § 3223(a)(4)(A)(i)  (1982).
55.  "No  state shall deny equal educational opportunity  to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin by.  . .(f) the failure by an educational  agency to take  appropriate
action to overcome  language  barriers  that impede equal  participation by  its students  in  its instruc-
tional  programs."  20 U.S.C.  § 1703  (1982).
56.  See  Baker & de Kanter, Federal Policy and the Effectiveness  of Bilingual Education, in  BILINGUAL
EDUCATION:  A  REAPPRAISAL  OF  FEDERAL  POLICY  33,  34-35  (K.  Baker  & A.  de  Kanter  eds.  1983)
(describing  English  as  a  second  language  (ESL),  structured  immersion,  and  transitional  bilingual
education);  Carpenter-Huffman  & Samulon,  Case Studies of Delivery and Cost of Bilingual Education, in
BILINGUAL  EDUCATION:  A  REAPPRAISAL  OF FEDERAL  POLICY,  supra, at  141,  145-50 (describing variety
of instructional  methods  and choices  among  self-contained  classrooms  and pull-out  programs);  see
also  S.  GOLDSTEIN  &  E.  GEE,  LAW  AND  PUBLIC  EDUCATION:  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  801  (1980)
(describing  1) segregation  of non-English  speaking  students  in  classrooms  where  instructors  use
English and their own language;  2) segregated students  taught in their own language and instructed
in English as a second  language;  3) integrated  classroom where  both English and other language are
used; and 4)  English  as a second language, placing minority  students  in mainstream  classroom with
supplementary  English instruction).  Thus, programs may differ in both the mix of services they com-
bine and  the setting in which  the services are  offered.
57.  OFFICE  FOR  CIVIL  RIGHTS,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF HEALTH,  EDUCATION  AND  WELFARE,  TASK  FORCE
FINDINGS  SPECIFYING  REMEDIES  FOR  ELIMINATING  PAST  EDUCATIONAL  PRACTICES  RULED  UNLAWFUL
UNDER  LAU  V. NICHOLS (1975),  reprinted  in BILINGUAL  EDUCATION:  A  REAPPRAISAL  OF FEDERAL  POLICY
213, 221  (1983)  [hereinafter  cited as  LAU  GUIDELINES].
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nor does  ESL expose the English-speaking  students to the language or culture
of the  non-English-speaking  students.58
A  variant  on  this  model,  called  "transitional  bilingual  education,"  also
aims  for transition from  special  treatment  to  total integration  in  the regular
classroom.  Under  this  approach, subject matter instruction  may temporarily
be conducted  in  the children's home language until  their proficiency  in  Eng-
lish  improves  enough  to  enable  participation  in  the  regular  classroom.59
Because both the transitional variation and ESL seek to integrate the minority
language  student  in  mainstream  classes,  any  segregation  under  these  pro-
grams is intended  to be temporary.  Nonetheless, segregated instruction often
stretches  longer  than  planned  since  the  child  may  have  fallen  behind  the
mainstream class in other subjects or may perform less successfully because of
the prior language  barrier.
The  second major type  of program,  commonly  called  bilingual-bicultural
education, combines  native language instruction  in  substantive courses,  ESL
training,  and instruction  in the culture  and history  of both America  and  the
nation  or group associated  with the student's native language.  Programs  are
additionally  distinguishable  by  whether  their  cultural  emphasis  addresses
"surface"  culture,  such  as  crafts and  music,  or "deep"  culture,  such  as  atti-
tudes about family,  health, and  sex roles.60  In  1975,  the U.S. Commission  on
Civil Rights identified six objectives in this kind of program:  (1) fostering the
student's healthy self-image;  (2)  developing cognitive  powers;  (3)  creating an
atmosphere  not totally  alien  to  the  child's  familiar  environment;  (4)  devel-
oping  reading  skills;  (5)  teaching  language  skills  systematically;  and  (6)
improving  English  skills.6 t  Although  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  specify  a
preference  for bilingual-bicultural  programs, the Department of Health,  Edu-
cation  and  Welfare  did  so  after Lau  in  advisory  form.62  Subsequent  legal
developments,  however,  complicated  both federal and  state postures  on this
issue.
b.  Post-Lau  Legal  Developments.  Shortly  after  Lau,  the  Supreme  Court
decided  Regents  of the  University of California v.  Bakke,63  which  reopened  the
issue  of  what  affirmative  obligations  public  educational  institutions  might
have  to  minorities;  Bakke  required  demonstration  of  discriminatory  intent
before  affirmative  remedies  could  be  ordered  by  school  authorities.  Next,
Congress itself increased federal support for bilingual programs; building on
58.  See S.  GOLDSTEIN  & E.  GEE,  supra note  56, at 801.
59.  Birman  & Ginsberg, Addressing the Needs of Langage-Minority Children, in  BILINGUAL  EDUCA-
TION:  A REAPPRAISAL  OF FEDERAL POLICY xi-Xii (1983).  See also LAU  GUIDELINES,  supra note 57, at 221.
The  task  force  report  particularly  opposed  ESL  for elementary  school  students  unless  modified
through  the transitional method.  Id. at 215.
60.  Gonzales,  Reinforcing Culture in Three Bilingual  Education  Programs, in EARLY  CHILDHOOD  BILIN-
GUAL  EDUCATION:  A  HISPANIC  PERSPECTIVE  93,  96-99  (T. Escobedo  ed.  1983).
61.  U.S.  COMMISSION  ON  CIVIL RIGHTS,  BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL  EDUCATION:  A  BETTER  CHANCE
TO  LEARN  1, 29-30  (Clearinghouse  Publication  51,  1975).
62.  LAU  GUIDELINES,  supra note 57,  at 215-18.
63.  438 U.S.  265 (1978).
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the  1968 amendment  to the Elementary  and Secondary  Education Act, Con-
gress adopted  amendments  in  1974  and  in  1978  which  expanded  the  target
population  for  federally-aided  services.64   Congress  did  not  oblige  local
school  authorities  to  adopt  bilingual-bicultural  programs  in  implementing
equal  opportunity  requirements;  instead,  the statutes  preserved local  school
discretion  on this  issue. 65  The  statutory  definition  of "program  of bilingual
education"  employed  the  flexible  language  of  "to  the  extent  necessary"
regarding both  the use  of the  child's  native language  and the integration  of
bicultural  materials  with  other  subjects.66  Although  some  have  argued  that
the  federal  commitment  continued  to favor  bilingual-bicultural  programs, 67
the  legislative  and  administrative  record  itself  is  unclear.  Federal  judicial
interpretation  of these statutes  has  also  produced ambiguous  results. 68  The
legal  ambiguity,  which  may  have  emerged  from  political  conflict,  promotes
continued political battles among interest groups over which of the permitted
types of programs  for minority  language  students should be used. 69
64.  See Bilingual  Education Act of 1968,  Pub. L. No.  90-247,  tit. VII,  §§  701-708,  81  Stat. 783;
Act of Nov.  1,  1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561,  tit.  7,  § 702, 92 Stat. 2143  (amendment expanding services
to students  with limited proficiency  in reading, writing, and speaking English); Act of Aug. 21,  1974,
Pub.  L.  No.  93-380,  tit.  7,  § 702,  81  Stat. 484  (expanding  services  beyond  low  income  children)
(current version at 20 U.S.  §  § 3221-3261  (1982));  see also Morales v.  Shannon,  516 F.2d 411,  415 (5th
Cir.  1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.  1034  (1975)  (unlawful educational  practice to fail  to take appropriate
action  to  overcome  language  barriers);  Equal  Educational  Opportunity  Act,  20  U.S.C.  §  1703()
(1982)  (prohibiting "failure  by an  educational  agency  to take  appropriate  action  to  overcome  lan-
guage barriers  that impede  equal  participation").
65.  See 20  U.S.C.  § 3222  (1982)  (federal  grants program).  State legislation  also generally does
not specify  which  form  of bilingual  program  schools  must  use.  See  e.g.,  TEX.  EDUC.  CODE  ANN.,
§ 21.451;  (Vernon  Supp.  1973)  (requiring bilingual  instruction).  But see  MASS.  ANN.  LAws  ch.  71A,
§§  1-9  (Law. Co-op.  1978)  (requiring transitional program  but including instruction  in  history  and
culture of native  language speakers).
66.  Thus, the statute  defines  a  "program  of bilingual  education"  in  elementary  and secondary
schools  as  a program  where  "there  is instruction  given  in,  and  study of, English and,  to the  extent
necessary to allow the child  to achieve competence  in  the English  language,  the native language  of
the children  of limited  English proficiency,  and  such  instruction  is  given  with  appreciation  for  the
cultural  heritage  of such  children,  and  of other children  in  American  society,  and,  with  respect  to
elementary  and secondary  school instruction,  such instruction shall, to the extent necessary, be in all
courses  or  subjects of study which will  allow a child  to  progress effectively  through the educational
system  . . . ."  20 U.S.C.  §  3223  (a)(4)(A)(i)  (1982).
67.  See N.Y. Times, May  14,  1983, at 22,  col. 1 (editorial page) (criticizing federal  "blessing"  for
native  language  maintenance  programs).  The regulations  proposed  but never implemented  under
the Carter administration  would  have  required  bilingual  instruction  for eligible students  instead of
ESL, 45  Fed.  Reg.  52,052  (1980)  (proposed  regulation),  but  as  the  Secretary  of Education  later
described,  these  regulations  were  intended  "to  require  school  districts  to teach  non-English  profi-
cient youngsters  English as  quickly as possible, and, while the children were learning English,  to give
them instruction  in  required  courses  in  a language  they  could  understand."  Hufstedler,  Is America
Over-Lawyered?,  31  CLEV.  ST. L.  REV.  371,  380  (1982); see also Haft, Assuring Equal Educational  Opportu-
nity for Language-Minority Students:  Bilingual  Education and the Equal Educational Opportunity  Act  of 1974,
18  COLUM. J.L.  & Soc.  PROBS.  209,  258-63  (1983)  (arguing that  Congressional  and  administrative
authority  favored  bilingual  programs).
68.  Compare Cintron  v.  Brentwood  Union  Free School  Dist.,  455  F.  Supp.  57,  62-64  (E.D.N.Y.
1978)  (requiring bilingual and  bicultural instructional methods)  with Rios  v.  Read, 480 F.  Supp.  14,
22  (E.D.N.Y.  1978)  (requiring temporary  bilingual instruction) and Guadalupe  Org.,  Inc.  v.  Tempe
Elementary  School  Dist.,  587  F.2d  1022,  1030  (9th Cir.  1978)  (approving  nonbilingual-bicultural
program  to  meet the needs of language-minority  students).
69.  See Hufstedler, supra note 67, at 380-81  (discussing public  debate over federal  regulations);
Daley, Panel  Asks Stress on English Studies, N.Y. Times, May 6,  1983, at  1, col.  1 (debate among Hispanic
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The contrast between  ESL instruction and bilingual-bicultural  instruction
illustrates  the  most  obvious  contrast  between  the different  solutions  to  the
dilemma;  the  continuing  debate between  the  two  models  demonstrates  how
the  dilemma  structures  common  understandings.  ESL proposes  short-term
segregation  during part of the school day, and long-term integration,  with an
abandonment  of minority identity, in the  school context.  Its critics argue that
the  program  reconfirms  the  association  of  difference  with  inferiority  by
refusing  to recognize  the  positive experiences  of minority  difference  and by
failing  to  instruct  either  minority  or  majority  children  in  the  minority  lan-
guage and  culture.  Bilingual-bicultural  programs  attempt  to meet  this  criti-
cism,  but in  turn  encounter  the  other  side  of the  dilemma.  By  reinforcing
minority  difference  and  prolonging  separation,  such  programs  risk  recon-
firming the  identification of difference with  alien and inferior  status and also
risk failing to prepare their students for a society that makes mastery  of Eng-
lish language  and American  culture  a precondition for success.
3.  Special Education Law and the Diference Dilemma.  The legal framework  for
special  education  combines  a  general  ban  on  discrimination  to protect  the
handicapped  in any program receiving federal  funds and a  categorical  assist-
ance grant program which conditions the grants on statewide compliance  with
substantive  and  procedural  requirements  to  educate  exceptional  children.
The general  antidiscrimination  ban,  section  504 of the  Rehabilitation  Act  of
1973,70 follows  the  model  of the Civil  Rights  Act- of  1964,71 which  supplied
the basis for  the Lau v.  Nichols decision and which  forbids exclusion  from  or
denial of benefits due to an individual's race, color or national origin.  Section
504 in part borrows the  same structure-forbidding  exclusion of or denial  of
benefits  to a member of the protected group, here  handicapped  persons,  by
any  program  receiving  federal  support.  Section  504  also  adds  the  require-
ment that the protected minority  group member, here a handicapped  person,
be "otherwise  qualified"  for the program or benefits before the provisions  of
the law may apply. 72  Thus, section 504 describes  with considerable ambiguity
the group it actually protects;  the statute does not clearly indicate  whether it
covers  persons  qualified  except  for their handicap  or persons  qualified even
given  their  handicap.  Southeastern Community  College v.  Davis73  presented  this
definitional ambiguity, and the Supreme Court found that section  504 did not
require the  school  to undertake  affirmative  steps  to accommodate  the  needs
and education  communites  over programs  for English  proficiency.);  Lopez,  Bilingual Schooling Comes
Under Review, The Sunday Record, Jan. 31,  1982, at 1, col. 6 (Bergen/Passaic/Hudson  Counties, New
Jersey)  (state legislation  debated  to alter bilingual  programs developed  under federal  law).
70.  29 U.S.C.  § 794 (1982):  "No  otherwise  qualified handicapped  individual in the United Sates
...shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation  in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving  Federal financial  assist-
ance  . . ..
71.  Pub.  L.  No.  88-352,  78  Stat.  241  (codified  as  amended  at 42  U.S.C.  §§  2000a to  2000h-6
(1982)).
72.  See supra note  70.
73.  442  U.S.  397,  407, 413  (1979).
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of a deaf student in  a  college nursing program.  The case  did not, however,
resolve  the issue of the coverage  of the  section in  any more general  fashion.
The Court concluded  that "[a]n  otherwise qualified  person is one who is able
to meet all of a program's  requirements  in spite of his handicap," 74  but also
reasoned  that  a  refusal  to  modify  an  existing  program  to  accommodate  a
handicapped  person  could  amount  to illegal  discrimination. 75  The  Court's
decision left case-by-case  analysis as the likely mode for interpreting  the law.76
The second federal  statute  framing special  education  policy  is  commonly
known  as  the  Education  for  All  Handicapped  Children  Act  (EAHCA). 77  Its
complicated  terms  produce programmatic  choices for local authorities  which
deserve  some elaboration.  The difference dilemma highlights  both the statu-
tory commitments  and the programmatic  choices.
As a  state or local activity,  public education  receives  major  funding from
state and local  sources.  Through  the EAHCA,  however,  the  federal  govern-
ment  provides  financial  incentives  for state  provision  of special  services  for
handicapped  children. 78  To  obtain  grants under  the Act, an  applicant  state
must submit a  plan  on  a yearly  basis  which  details  how  the state  intends  to
meet the Act's objectives; the federal objectives, then, are adopted by the state
in exchange  for accepting federal assistance.  The Act's  objectives include (1)
identifying  all  handicapped  children  needing  special  education  and  related
services; 79  (2)  protecting  rights of children and their parents  to nondiscrimi-
nation in the evaluation and placement process and confidentiality in the han-
dling of personally  identifiable  data;80  and  (3)  mainstreaming,  or integrating
74.  Id. at 406.
75.  Id. at 411-12.
76.  See Note, Employment Discrimination  Against the Handicapped  and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act:  An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV.  L.  REV. 997,  1009 (1984).  See generally Wegner,  The Antidis-
crimination Model Reconsidered  Ensuring  Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation  Act  of 1973, 69 CORNELL  L.  REV.  401,  452-58 (1984)  (discussing Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis,  442  U.S.  397  (1979)).
77.  Pub. L. No. 94-142,  89  Stat.  773  (1975)  (codified  as  amended  at  20  U.S.C.  §§  1400-1461
(1982)).  See generally Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The  Effect of Scarce Resources on  the Imple-
mentation of Pub. L. No.  94-142, 14  CONN.  L.  REV. 447, 479-84  (1982)  (describes how EAHCA works);
Note, Enforcing the Right to an  "Appropriate" Education:  The Education  for All  Handicapped  Children Act of
1975,  92  HARV.  L.  REV.  1103,  1104-08  (1979)  (discusses  history  of  EAHCA  and  statutory
framework).
78.  20 U.S.C.  §§  1411-1420 (1982)  (grant programs).  Also, the Act defines "handicap"  broadly;
and  its  interpretive  regulations  focus on  whether  a  child  has  an  impairment  and  because of that
impairment  needs special education  and related  services.  34  C.F.R.  § 300.5(a)  (1984).  Aside  from
such defined  impairments  as  deafness  and  mental  retardation,  the  regulations  also  identify "other
health  impaired"  conditions  that  "adversely  affects  a  child's  educational  performance."  Id.
§ 300.5(a)(7); see also id. § 300.5(a)(8)(i)  ("seriously emotionally disturbed"  conditions defined as one
or more characteristics "which  adversely affect educational performance").
79.  "Related  services"  are noneducational  services that may  be essential  if  a handicapped  stu-
dent  is  to  benefit from education;  such  services  can include transportation,  speech pathology,  psy-
chological services, physical therapy, and diagnostic medical  services.  20 U.S.C.  §  1401(17)  (1982);
34  C.F.R.  § 300.13  (1984).  Litigation over  the  definition of "related  services"  under  the  Act  has
been extensive.  See, e.g.,  Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro,  104  S.  Ct. 2379 (1984)  (heart  catheteri-
zation is  covered); In re San Mateo  County  Sup't of Schools,  1980-81  EDUC.  HANDICAPPED  L. REP.
(CRR)  502:199  (Cal.  SEA  1980)  (sign  language instruction for child's parents  covered).
80.  20 U.S.C.  § 1412(5)(C)  (1982)  (testing and evaluation procedures not to be racially or  cul-
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handicapped  children with nonhandicapped.8'  While the federal government
leaves  to  each  participating state  the task  of detailing  the actual  programs  it
will  use to achieve  these goals,  the EAHCA  specifies  a set of substantive  and
procedural  rights  that  each  participating  state  must endorse.  Substantively,
each  participating  state  must  guarantee  every  handicapped  child  a  "free
appropriate  public  education" 82  and  an  education  in  the  "least  restrictive
environment"  possible-which means mainstreaming  the child in a classroom
with nonhandicapped  children if possible, or if not, then the closest approxi-
mation  that  can  serve  the  child's  needs.8 3  Exactly  what  these  substantive
requirements  mean  for  individual  children  has  emerged  as  a  legal
battleground.
84
Such  disputes  become  comprehensible  as  expressions  of the  difference
dilemma.  Whether and how much to mainstream  an exceptional child clearly
presents  the  issue  of whether  to respond  to  difference  by  separation  or  by
integration.  The problem is  whether in order to overcome stigma, social iso-
lation,  and  inter-group  misunderstanding,  a  child  with  a  severe  hearing
impairment  should  be enrolled  in  a  mainstream  classroom8 5  or instead  in  a
special class or school for deaf children.  As with analogous  issues in bilingual
education,  the dilemma  truly presents  two  sides:  a deaf student  may  experi-
ence  the  pain  of attributed  inferiority and  isolation amid  a  class  of hearing
turally discriminatory);  20  U.S.C.  §  1417(c)  (1982)  (protection of rights and privacy  of parents  and
students).
81.  20  U.S.C.  §  1412(5)(B)  (1982).  SeeJ. SHRYBMAN,  supra note 41,  at  13-14  (discussing statu-
tory purposes).
82.  20 U.S.C.  §  1401(18) (1982):  "The term "free appropriate public education"  means special
education and related services  which  (A) have been provided  at public expense, under public super-
vision  and direction, and without charge;  (B)  meet the standards of the state educational  agency; (C)
include  an appropriate  preschool, elementary, and secondary  school education in the state involved;
and  (D)  are provided in  conformity with  the individualized  education  program required  under sec-
tion  1414(a)(5) of this  title."
83.  To  qualify  for  federal  financial  assistance,  a  state  should demonstrate  that  it  established
"procedures  to  assure  that,  to the  maximum  extent  appropriate,  handicapped  children,  including
children  in  public or private institutions or other care facilities,  are educated with children  who are
not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling,  or other removal of handicapped  chil-
dren from the regular educational environment  occurs only when the nature or severity of the hand-
icap  is such that education in  regular classes  with the use of supplementary  aids and services  cannot
be  achieved  satisfactorily."  20  U.S.C.  §  1412(5)(B)  (1982).  As  with  bilingual  programming,  pro-
grams  may differ in both the mix of services  provided, and the setting where the services are offered;
the  requirement  of "appropriate"  education  may  refer  to  both the setting and  the mix  of services,
while  the requirement  of the  "least  restrictive"  placement  refers  to the  setting-but may  influence
the mix of services and  their delivery.
84.  See  Board of Educ.  v.  Rowley,  458 U.S.  176  (1982);  Armstrong  v. Kline,  476  F.  Supp. 583
(E.D.  Pa.  1979),  remanded on other grounds, Battle v.  Pennsylvania,  629 F.2d  269  (3d Cir.  1980),  cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981)  (self-sufficiency education).  See generally Comment, Self-Sufficiency  Under the
Education of All  Handicapped Children Act:  A  Suggested Approach,  1981  DUKE  LJ.  516,  519-27  (1981)
(discussing varied  interpretations  of statute's  substantive  requirements);  Neal  & Kirp,  The Allure of
Legalization Reconsidered:  The Case of Special Education, LAW  & CONTEMP.  PROBs.,  Winter  1985, at 63,  71-
72  (substance of rights  for handicapped  children  unspecified  by  law; elaboration  depends  on indi-
vidual education  plan); Note, Legal Remedies for the Misclassication  or Wrongful Placement of Educationally
Handicapped Children,  14  COLUM.  J.L.  & Soc.  PROaS.  389  (1979)  (discussing  litigation  challenging
over-classification  and under-classification  affecting placement  and services).
85.  This option  could  involve  some special instruction  during part of the school  day.  See infra
notes  135-43 and accompanying  text (discussing Board  of Educ.  v. Rowley,  458 U.S.  176  (1982)).BILINGUAL  AND  SPECIAL  EDUCATION
children, but he or she may have a similar experience  of stigma and alienation
from segregation  in  the separate  class  for deaf children.  Although  the statu-
tory commitment  to the "least  restrictive"  placement might support the main-
stream classroom placement,  the statutory commitment to the "appropriate"
educational  placement  could  be used  to support an alternative,  and the lan-
guage of the  statute itself does not resolve  this choice.86
Cost  concerns,  of course,  are  likely  to influence  the  placement  choices.
Although  the requirement of the least restrictive  alternative  was endorsed  by
Congress  to overcome  the detriment8 7 and  isolation experienced  by children
in such placements,  least restrictive placements  may be pushed in practice  by
the  school departments  confronting  budgetary  constraints.  The  administra-
tion thus may favor "mainstreaming"  or providing some other placement that
is cheaper  than  totally separate  instruction.  In that case,  the placements  may
fail  to  provide  the  benefits  of an  education  appropriate  to  the  particular
child's needs,  as required  by the Act.  An extreme  case arises  with residential
schooling,  perhaps  the  most  restrictive  alternative  and  the  most  expensive
placement  option,  and  yet  conceivably  the appropriate  placement  for  some
severely  disabled  children.  Regulations  promulgated  to  implement  the
EAHCA  mandate  that  when  residential  placement  is  "necessary  to  provide
special  education  and related  services  to a  handicapped  child,  the program,
including non-medical  care and room and board, must be provided at no cost
to the  parents.  ...  "88  Parents  who  prefer a  residential  placement  for  their
children even  when  the placement  process yields  a nonresidential  placement
must assume  the costs  of the placement themselves.  With  such considerable
sums  of money  involved,  it  is  not  surprising  that  residential  programming
issues  are the  most frequently  litigated  topic in  special  education. 89  Parents
favoring  residential placements  have  prevailed or obtained  opportunities  for
reconsideration  of adverse  school decisions  in cases where the school system
committed  procedural  errors  in the  placement process 90  and where  the  resi-
86.  If the statute had included only one of the terms-appropriate  or least restrictive-the ambi-
guity would remain because both terms can be used to support contrasting placements.  The statute's
inclusion of both  terms exposes on the surface of the law the tension  between mainstreaming  goals
and tailor-made  education  responding  to  the "different"  student.
87.  One  possible detriment, asserted  by some critics,  is that programs for disabled  people may
create the disability alleged.  See S.  SARASON &J.  DORIS,  supra note 38,  at 42  (describing "iatrogenic
retardation-a form of intellectual  retardation  that  is induced by the very  system  designed to  foster
intellectual development").  See generally AN  ALTERNATE TEXTBOOK  IN SPECIAL  EDUCATION  (1977)  (crit-
icizing  creation  of  inequality  based  on  assumed  disabilities).  One  special  education  teacher
described  the instance  of a  misdiagnosed  child  who  manifested  the symptoms  associated  with  the
diagnosis-and whose parents reinforced and expected  those symptoms in the child.  "She  had been
in a classroom  with a lot of kids who had  cerebral palsy.  When we  started changing that, the parents
took her out of the program.  Because  'You're  changing our daughter!'  They didn't like that at all."
K.  HOWELL,  INSIDE  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  27  (1984).
88.  34 C.F.R.  § 300.302  (1984).
89.  See  Mooney  & Aronson,  Solomon  Revisited:  Separating Educational and Other Than  Educational
Needs  in  Special Education Residential Placements,  14  CONN.  L.  REv.  531  (1982).
90.  See, e.g.,  Lang v. Braintree School Comm.,  545 F.  Supp.  1221,  1228 (D.  Mass.  1982)  (failure
to  include  parents  in  IEP  planning  process);  Matthews  v.  Ambach,  552  F.  Supp.  1273,  1278-79
(W.D.N.Y.  1982)  (deaf child permitted  to sue for  monetary damages  after delay in school placement
decision).
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dential  placement  preserved  the  status  quo  or  educational  progress  of the
child. 9 1  School  systems  have  prevailed  by  demonstrating  that  day-school
placements  are  appropriate  even  if, on  a  comparative  basis,  they  are  less
appropriate  than  residential  placements. 92  The  statutory  framework  itself
structures  this set of arguments,  while  the cost concerns  propel  the  schools,
and the desire  to maximize  services  motivates  the parents.
Where  less restrictive placements,  like special  classes, are at issue for stu-
dents  with  behavioral  or  learning  problems,  the  teacher's  interests  may
counter  the  school  administration's  desire  to  provide  a  cheaper  placement
than  the  "appropriate"  one authorized  by statute.  In  this  context,  teachers
may  push  for  an  "appropriate"  placement  outside  the  mainstream  class-
room.93  This very rhetoric of "appropriate"  placements  may, in  use, conflict
with the statute's  simultaneous commitment to the least restrictive placement.
After  all,  the  commitment  to  the least  restrictive  alternative  was  devised  in
part to combat  this very  reluctance of the classroom  teacher  to deal  with the
unusual or more difficult child.  One special education  teacher  explained  that
some  teachers
think these kids really don't belong  in the classroom  or in the school, for that matter.
They just basically refuse  to  teach  them ....  Teacher contracts don't stipulate  cer-
tain  kinds  of kids-they just stipulate  that you will  teach  a  certain  subject matter  or
grade level.  It is not right that some  teachers decide not to do their job because a  kid
isn't behaving  the  way  the  teacher  prefers.  I  think we've  gotten  to  the  point  now
where  we  select out the  LD  [learning disabled]  kids  and send  them off to  LD  class-
rooms,  the  EH  [emotionally  handicapped]  kids  go  to  EH  classrooms,  the  hearing-
handicapped  go  to hearing-handicapped  classrooms,  visually-impaired  go to  visually-
impaired classrooms,  and the physically  handicapped  go  off somewhere  else, and the
gifted go off to Europe and study paintings, or whatever the hell they do.  By the time
you pull them  all out,  you've got this little core group  of average  WASPs,  and  that's
kind of frightening to me.  . . [so]  I do a lot of reinforcement of the regular classroom
teachers who  are willing to work, or at least attempt to work with the kids that  I phase
back  in the regular classes.
9 4
The  teachers'  expectations,  then, can  lead them  to  define as  different many
student subgroups  by reference  to the statutory  commitment  to serving  indi-
vidual student's needs.  Again, the ambiguity preserved  by the statutory com-
mitments  to  both  the  "least  restrictive"  and  the  "appropriate"  education
permit the incentives  of teachers,  the desires of parents, and the pressures of
budgets  to  give content  to  the  law.  The  statutory  ambiguity  itself preserves
91.  See, e.g.,  Lang v. Braintree School Comm.,  545 F. Supp.  1221,  1228  (D.  Mass.  1982);  Appel
v. Ambach,  1982-83  EDUC.  HANDICAPPED  L.  REP.  554:236  (S.D.N.Y.  1982)  (emotionally-disturbed
child; case  remanded for completion  of IEP).
92.  See, e.g.,  Hessler  v. Board of Educ., 700 F.2d  134 (4th Cir.  1983)  (also by demonstrating that
parents  failed  to  pursue  administrative  remedies);  Cain v. Yukon  Pub.  Schools,  556  F.  Supp.  605
(W.D. Ok.  1983).
93.  See  MASSACHUSETTs  DEP'T  OF EDUC.,  FINAL  REPORT:  IMPLEMENTING  MASSACHUSETrS'  SPECIAL
EDUCATION  LAW:  A STATEWIDE  ASSESSMENT  56  (1982)  (prepared  by James  McGarray)  [hereinafter
cited as  MASS.  REPORT].  Of course, budgetary and bureaucratic constraints may produce simple non-
compliance  with even the procedural  dimensions  of the statute,  COURT MONITOR'S  REPORT,  SUFFOLK
SUPERIOR  COURT  23-25  (1982)  (30  percent  of Boston  schools'  noncompliance  with  court  order
results  from  failure to implement  IEP requirement).
94.  K.  HOWELL,  supra note  87,  at 81  (quoting Win  Chadwick).
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for  the  implementation  stage  the  dilemma  of  difference;  placement  and
programmatic decisions receive little guidance about when to favor the  "least
restrictive"  placement  and when  to find "appropriate"  some more restrictive
alternative,  and  these  choices  express  the  simultaneous  concerns  about
making student difference  matter and not matter.
Another statutory ambiguity becomes understandable in light of the differ-
ence dilemma:  specifically, the statute is unclear about which children shall be
included within  the reach of its guarantees  and  this ambiguity expresses  well
the pros and cons of identifying difference.  Given the guarantee of individual
assessments and diagnoses, the Act on its face would authorize  the evaluation
of any and every child in a state system;  given the concern  to meet the needs
of all children  who, because of impairments, need special education,  conceiv-
ably any child could claim  entitlement to benefits  under the Act.  Yet the pro-
cedural dimensions of the EAHCA, which  supply the motor and structure for
the  operating  programs,  assure  protection  against labeling a  child  as handi-
capped  without  diagnostic  testing.95  These  procedural  dimensions  express
the statute's  contrasting commitment to guard against  the negative  effects  of
being labeled  as  "different."  This  tension  between  restricting  and enabling
labeling actually  occurs  within  the procedural  mechanisms  themselves.  The
procedural requirements not only guard against unjustified labeling, they also
link diagnosis  to entitlements:  if the testing identifies special needs, the child
then is  entitled  to an Individualized  Education Plan  (IEP)96 that  specifies  the
type of services  the  child  needs, who  will provide  those  services,  the educa-
tional objectives for the individual child, and plans to evaluate  the child's pro-
gress.97  The  Act  further  details  procedural  rights  for  the  child's  parents
during the evaluation process, including rights to challenge educational place-
ment  decisions  within  the  school  administrative  structure  and  ultimately
before  a state appellate court or federal  district court. 98
An  evaluative  study  concluded  that  the EAHCA  encourages  lawsuits  and
gives  parents  and  children  leverage  to  obtain  favorable  settlements  from
school systems, but minimally  affects  the court workload.99  If this  is the case,
the  procedural  dimensions  of the  special  education  programs  constitute  a
95.  20 U.S.C.  §  1412(5)(C)  (1982).
96.  Id. §  1412(4).
97.  See  id. §§  1401(19),  1412(2)-(6).
98.  Id.  § 1415(e)(2).  Parents  also  are  entitled  to  written  notice  of any  education  decision
adopted  by the school,  id. § 1415(b)(1)(C);  they are entitled to  access to all records  that the school
maintains on the child, id. § 1415(b)(1)(A);  and to participate in educational decisions made by place-
ment teams,  id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii).  In these respects the Act implements a traditional conception of
due  process, complete  with notice,  participation and  impartial  review elements.  These  procedural
dimensions can also be conceived  as implementing a medical model, which begins with diagnosis and
evaluation,  and culminates  in treatment  and  review,  with  opportunities  for obtaining second,  and
even third opinions.  Cf  Minow & Kraft, Deinstitutionalization of the Chronically Mentally III (Dec. 8,
1982)  (unpublished manuscript).  The prevalence of a medical model in the special education  litera-
ture  is compatible with  the individualized assessment dimension of the due process  framework.
99.  MASS.  REPORT, supra note 93,  at 9-11,  27-28; see also Handler, Special Education and Cooperative
Decision-Making, in THE  DISCRETIONARY  DECISION  (1984)  (procedural rights  give parents  bargaining
power).  Some  school personnel have  concluded that the procedural requirements divert educators'
attention from substantive educational questions.  P.  HILL & D.  MADEY,  EDUCATIONAL  POLICY MAKING
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major  reallocation  of power  to  parents  in  the  assignment  of  educational
resources  and  placements.  The  substantive  dimensions  of  the  program
remain ambiguous,  however, especially  regarding  what kind of special needs
should entitle  the  child  to  special  placements  or services.  In  the  context  of
this substantive ambiguity, the procedural mechanisms  may empower parents
to  demand  an  evaluation  of the  child,  and  to  pursue  educational  services
responsive  to  his or her needs even where  the child  in  previous times would
not have been  considered handicapped.
This  hypothetical  problem  is  a  genuine  issue  raised  by  the  category  of
"learning disabilities."  Increasing recognition by educators of perceptual and
psychological  conditions which impair learning can be used to identify handi-
capping  conditions  of  increasing  numbers  of  students;  this  category  of
learning disabilities already includes the largest number of students served by
special education. 0 0  One expert observed that the incidence of learning disa-
bilities  in  the  school-aged  population  has been  estimated  as  anywhere  from
one  to ten percent,  and  he  noted further that  "[a]n outstanding  elementary
school principal stated to this writer that 83 percent of her center-city elemen-
tary school  pupils  functioned  as  if they  were perceptually  handicapped."'' 0 1
Although  labeling a  child  as  handicapped  can  carry a  stigma, categorization
under  the Act  also carries  educational benefits,  and parents  may  seek  to use
this route  to obtain extra services and attention for children  who once would
have  been  called  slow  learners.' 0 2  The  attraction  of labeling, then,  for  the
purpose  of getting  services  may  produce  more  attribution  of "difference"
than before the statute, and it is not clear what the stigmatizing effects  will be.
Nor  is  it clear  what  the labels  mean,  given these conflicting  pressures  to
assign  and  to avoid  assigning  them.  One administrator  commented:
You guys at the university  teach about the characteristics  of MR  [mental retardation]  as if
MR  is  real.  It may be real  in a laboratory  but in the classroom  MR is  whatever I give
out money for.  The teachers think they are teaching kids with recognizable handicaps
resulting from chromosomes  or brain damage  or parenting.  That's a crock ....  The
kids in handicapped  programs are in  those programs  because  they made it through  a
chain  of policy  and  procedure ....  Funding  procedures  are  the  primary  cause  of
THROUGH  THE  CIVIL JUSTICE  SYSTEM  5  (Rand  Institute for  Civil Justice  1983)  (reporting results  of
study of school superintendants).
100.  DIVISION  OF  EDUCATIONAL  SERVICES  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  PROGRAMS,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  EDUCA-
TION,  U.S.  OFFICE OF  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  AND  REHABILITATIVE  SERVICES,  FOURTH  ANNUAL  REPORT TO
CONGRESS  ON  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  PUBLIC  LAW  94-142:  THE  EDUCATION  FOR ALL  HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN  ACT  103  (1982);  STATE  PROGRAM  IMPLEMENTATION  STUDIES  BRANCH,  OFFICE  OF  SPECIAL
EDUCATION  AND  REHABILITATION  SERVICES,  SECOND  ANNUAL  REPORT TO  CONGRESS ON  THE  IMPLEMEN-
TATION  OF  PUBLIC  LAW  94-142:  THE  EDUCATION  FOR  ALL HANDICAPPED  CHILDREN  ACT,  161 (1980); see
also CHILDREN'S  HOSPITAL-BOSTON,  REPORT  OF  FINDINGS  FROM  THE  COLLABORATIVE  STUDY  OF  CHIL-
DREN  WITH  SPECIAL  NEEDS:  ROCHESTER  CITY SCHOOL  DIST.  19  (May  1984)  (learning problems cited
for over 70  percent of the children).
101.  Cruickshank,  Myths  and Realities in  Learning Disabilities,  10 J.  LEARNING  DISABILITIES  51
(1977),  reprinted in  EDUCATING  EXCEPTIONAL  CHILDREN  148,  151  (Annual Editions  79/80).
102.  Parents may also seek to invoke the statute to deal with a difficult  child, and the result may
be a battle of experts over whether the child's  difficulties are due to "severe  emotional disturbance"
or simply "characterological"  or personality  traits-with services following the first label and not the
second.  See  In  the Matter  of Peggy,  Fairoaks  County  Public  Schools,  Hearing  Officer's  Decision,
(May  12, 1980), reprinted inJ. SHRYBMAN,  supra note 41,  at 425-45.
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handicapping  conditions.  . . . The  point  is  that  a  kid  isn't  officially  handicapped
unless  he's labeled.  The labeling process  is designed  to secure funding.'
0 3
The service and  program benefits  available through labeling alter the  stigma
issue,  and  parents  or teachers  may  push  to label  a  child  in order  to  obtain
extra  educational  resources.  This  phenomenon  can  be  called  "magnet
labeling"  and  can  be  understood  as  the  consequences  of both  increasing
knowledge  about  and  programs  for learning  disabled  children.  School  sys-
tems currently  struggle  to develop definitions  of learning disabilities  to  con-
tain this demand for services and to limit the students covered  by the Act,  yet
nothing within the  Act itself provides  a basis for these limitations.
Aside  from  the  budgetary  and  administrative  burdens  posed  by  this
struggle, the  use of special education  procedures  to make entitlements  avail-
able  for  more  children  presents  a  new  version  of  the  difference  dilemma.
Inclusion  within the programs  for handicapped children  can  bear two  conse-
quences, one for each side of the difference dilemma.  Identification  as handi-
capped  entitles  the  child  to  individualized  educational  planning  and  special
services, but also labels the child as handicapped  and may expose the child to
attributions of inferiority  for this labeling  with the attendant  risks of stigma,
isolation,  and  reduced  self-esteem.  Nonidentification  frees  the  child  from
such labeling risks but also denies the child the specialized  attention and serv-
ices.  0 4  As school  districts encounter parents  clamoring for services for their
children  despite  the  labeling  problem,  the  procedural  dimensions  of the
EAHCA give  parents leverage to express their concern for whatever individu-
alized  attention  or  special  programs  their  children  can  receive.  The  stigma
issue,  then,  may  be  practically  overshadowed  by  real  benefits  or  effectively
avoided  by converting a minority of labeled,  special needs kids into a growing
and  specially  privileged category.
Thus the  individualized  focus  and  special  benefits  of the EAHCA  offer  a
double-barreled  version  of the  difference  dilemma:  nonidentification  of a
special  need may result in forgone special  benefits  and yet identification of a
special need may produce a stigmatizing label; at the same time, identification
of increasing numbers  of children  as having special  needs may overcome  the
risks of stigma and isolation, but by converting minority to majority, threaten
the definitional  and budgetary constraints  on serving the handicapped.  Thus,
the legal  framework  for  special  education  expresses  the  difference dilemma.
The  EAHCA embodies  an express  tension between  its  two  substantive  com-
mitments to the "appropriate  education"  and  to the "least restrictive alterna-
tive."  This tension invokes the choice between  specialized services and some
degree  of separate  treatment  on  the  one  side  and  minimized  labeling  and
minimized  segregation on the other.  Both substantive commitments  critically
depend on undisclosed delimiters that would give content to the key terms  of
103.  K.  HOWELL,  supra note 87,  at  280-81  (emphasis  in original).
104.  Cf  Liebman,  The  Definition of Disability in  Social  Security and  Supplemental Security  Income:
Drawing  the Bounds of the  Welfare Estates, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.  833, 854-55  (1976)  (denial of benefits  can
undermine security  and status even  where  benefits depend on finding of total  disability).
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"least,"  "appropriate,"  and "to  the extent feasible."  The procedural  protec-
tions express both a concern to restrict stigmatizing labels and mechanisms  to
press for those labels  as  a way  to secure  entitlements.
The other governing statute, section 504 of the Rehabilitation  Act, utilizes
a straightforward  ban  against  discrimination  and  does  not  designate  which
programmatic  alternatives  are  discriminatory:  does  discrimination  result
from mainstreaming or separate classes, from identification, labeling and spe-
cialized  services  or  nonidentification,  nonlabeling,  and  no  services?  The
search for answers to these open questions resurrects the difference  dilemma.
Are  there  any  ways  out  of the  dilemma?  The  next  section  identifies  some
possibilities,  but finds  them wanting.
III
FALSE  LEADS  OUT  OF  THE  DIFFERENCE  DILEMMA
Conceptual  approaches  to  bilingual  and  special  education  may  initially
suggest  routes  out  of the  difference  dilemma,  but  that  dilemma  reappears
even  in  such  alternative  approaches.  Thus,  at  first  it  may  seem  fruitful  to
focus  on the relationship  between means  and ends in  these educational  pro-
grams in order to avoid the problem of recreating difference through ignoring
it or through focusing upon it.  Similarly, it may at first seem useful to address
frameworks  for  constraining  the  power  of the  school  so  that  it  does  not
recreate difference.  Yet, upon examination,  these alternatives  reopen the dif-
ference  dilemma,  and  indeed,  draw  connections  between  this  problem  and
other problems  in the legal  and programmatic  construction  of schooling.
A.  Designing Means  for Chosen  Ends
Finding  the  right  means  for  desired  ends  is  a  familiar  implementation
problem  in  social  policy.  Attending  to  this  design  problem,  some  would
argue,  may  be  as or  more  important  than  the initial  policy  commitment. 1 0 5
Some  means/ends  problems  take  the  general  form  of unintended  conse-
quences  from  chosen  means  that  may  undermine  desired  ends.  Indeed,  a
standard  criticism  of schools  emphasizes  the  lack  of fit  between  the  means
105.  See,  e.g.,  J.  PRESSMAN  &  A.  WILDASKY,  IMPLEMENTATION  (1973);  E.  QUADE,  ANALYSIS  FOR
PUBLIC  DECISIONS  259-63  (1975).  Here, the design  problem  refers  to  the selection  of strategies  in
the initial  design of the program  rather than  the mastery of political, organizational, and psycholog-
ical constraints and resistences  to change.  For effective studies of this latter concern with implemen-
tation, see  Clune  &  Van  Pelt,  A  Political  Method of Evaluating the EAHCA  and the  Several Gaps of Gap
Analysis,  LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Winter  1985, at 7 (implementation  of special education programs
affected  by political  adjustment among competing  interests);  Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by  Due Process?.
Affecting the Outcome of Special Education Hearings  in Pennsylvania, Lw & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Winter  1985,
at 89;  Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered.  The Case of Special Education, LAw  & CONTEMP.
PROBS.,  Winter  1985,  at 63;  Weatherly  &  Lipsky,  Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation:
Implementing Special-Education  Reform, 47 HARV.  EDUC.  REV.  171  (1977).  The particular concern here is
instead with the choice between program designs aimed at creating enclaves different from the domi-
nant community and  programs aimed  at reflecting  the dominant community.  See  infra notes  108-33
and accompanying  text.
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schools use and the ends they seek. John Holt dramatizes  this criticism  while
telling of the student who handed in the ink copy of her written composition:
Our rule is that on the ink copy  there must be no more than three mistakes per page,
or the page must  be copied again.  I  checked  her paper, and on the first  page  found
five mistakes.  I  showed them to her, and told her, as gently as I could, that she had to
copy it again, and urged her to be more careful-typical  teacher's advice.  She looked
at me,  heaved  a  sigh,  and  went  back  to  her  desk.  She  is  left-handed,  and  doesn't
manage  a  pen  very well.  I  could  see her frowning  with concentration  as she worked
and struggled.  Back she came after a  while with  the second  copy.  This time the  first
page had seven mistakes, and the handwriting was noticeably worse.  I told her to copy
it again.  Another bigger sigh,  and she went  back to her desk.  In  time the third copy
arrived,  looking much  worse than the second,  and with  even more mistakes.
10 6
On  reflection,  Holt commented,
In schools-but where isn't  it so?-we so easily  fall into  the same trap:  the means  to
an end  becomes an end in itself.  I had on my hands  this three-mistake  rule meant  to
serve  the ends  of careful  work  and neat  compositions.  By  applying it  rigidly  was  I
getting more careful work and neater compositions?  No; I was getting a child who was
so worried about having to recopy  her paper that she could not concentrate on doing
it, and hence did it worse and worse, and would probably do the next papers  badly as
well. 107
The connections  between means  and ends in  bilingual and special educa-
tion are more complicated than the  governing  statutes imply.  The laws  gov-
erning both bilingual  and  special  education  rely at  key points  on  undefined
terms,  such  as  "appropriate,"  "to  the  maximum  extent  feasible,"  "to  the
extent  necessary,"  and  "to  progress  effectively."  Such  terms  on  their  face
imply  that  there  are  known  or  uncontroversial  connections  between  the
means  called for by the law and  the ends endorsed  by it-or  that reasonable
decisionmakers  could agree about what means will be appropriate, necessary,
and  so  forth.  Of course,  it  is  more likely  that legislators  and judges  adopt
such  terms  to  hold  off  for  another  day  debates  over  the  meaning  of such
delimiters.  The question  of how  to connect  means  to  ends  in  bilingual  and
special education,  not surprisingly,  triggers renewed controversy.  But it  may
be  surprising  to  see  the  difference  dilemma  reappearing  in  these
controversies.
1.  The  Design Dilemma and Bilingual Education.  The problem  of connecting
means  to  ends  was  left  open  in  Lau v.  Nichols:
1 0 8  what  programs  should  be
designed  to remedy the functional exclusion  of students without English pro-
ficiency in  regular classes  taught in  English?  This design problem is especially
tricky for two reasons.  First, the term "exclusion"  appeared  in  the governing
civil rights  statute framed  with  racial segregation  in  mind,'
0 9  but the "exclu-
sion"  of the  non-English-proficient  students  was not due to segregation,  but
to  the  lack  of fit  between  the  school  program  and  the  students'  own  back-
grounds.  The  remedy  obviously  could  not  simply be  to  integrate  such  stu-
106.  J.  HOLT,  How  CHILDREN  FAIL  133-34  (1964).
107.  Id.
108.  414 U.S.  563,  564-65  (1974);  see supra text accompanying  notes 48-52.
109.  Civil  Rights Act of 1964,  § 601,  78  Stat. 252  (codified at 42  U.S.C.  § 2000d (1982)).
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dents  into  existing  classrooms,  for  it  was  in  such  classrooms  that  these
students were effectively  excluded  from the educational  benefits.
Secondly,  and  also  growing  from  experience  with  racial  segregation  of
school children, the concern for student self-esteem as a key element  in equal
educational  opportunity  complicates  the  design  of bilingual  programs.  As
one observer of the federal  legislative process  on the  subject observed:
Arguments about the degree to which assimilation  process assaulted a child's  sense of
self-worth  led in  one  programmatic  direction,  while  contentions  about the  Hispanic
level of academic achievement  and school  dropout  rate,'  110]  had  they been  the most
compelling,  would have  led in  quite another.  That  is,  concern  solely  about the aca-
demic  record of children  of limited-English-speaking  ability would  have  led to  une-
quivocal  support for the establishment of transitional  programs aimed at giving  those
children  an  equal  educational  start.  But  concern  about  the  psychological  harm  of
forced  assimilation  lent legitimacy  to  the establishment  of programs  which  aimed  to
promote not scholastic achievement  but a  greater sense of self-worth by means of lin-
guistic  and  cultural  maintenance.  They  lent legitimacy  to  schools  within  schools,  to
ethnic  educational  enclaves run  for and  by ethnic groups.' I  I
It  is  important  to  clarify  that  the  concern  for  students'  senses  of self-worth
marks  debates  over  the  means,  not the  ends, of schooling.  Few if any  sup-
porters of bilingual-bicultural  education dispute that a major goal of such pro-
grams  is to develop  the students'  proficiency in  English." 2  To some extent,
the choice among different types of means to achieve this end may be resolved
with  reference  to  empirical  studies  of the  effectiveness  of contrasting  pro-
grams.  But such  studies are  currently  inconclusive,  and  the debate  focuses
not on effectiveness  but on the issue  of stigmatizing cultural difference.'
1 3
The design problem thus juxtaposes  preoccupation with English-language
proficiency  against  preoccupation  with creating environments  within schools
that are more hospitable  to children  who feel alien there.  The  first preoccu-
pation would  focus  on academic  skills  and English language  acquisition;  the
second  would  address  the  cultural  contrasts  between  child  and  school.
Designing programs  solely responsive  to either one of these concerns  could
exacerbate  the children's  educational  problems."14  The  difference  dilemma,
in short, reappears  at this point:  how to address  the  needs  of students  who
110.  Much of the  debate over bilingual  education  focuses on the Hispanic  experience.
111.  Implications of Bilingualism: Education, in THE  NEW  BILINGUALISM:  AN  AMERICAN  DILEMMA
155-56  (M.  Ridge  ed.  1981)  (quoting Abigail Thernstrom) (proceedings  of a conference  sponsored
by  the Center  for  Study of the American  Experience,  The Annenberg  School  of Communications,
University of Southern California,  May  1980).
112.  See  Lanier,  Teaching with Subtitles, CHI.  MAG.,  June  1984, at  163.
113.  There  are unresolved  debates over the effectiveness  of different programs simply  in terms
of producing  English  proficiency.  See L.  BACA  & H.  CERVANTES,  THE  BILINGUAL  SPECIAL  EDUCATION
INTERFACE  332-33  (1984)  (reviewing  debate  over effectiveness  of bilingual  programs);  Baker & de
Kanter, supra note  56,  at  33  (reviewing studies);  Carpenter-Huffman  & Samulon, supra note 56,  at
141,  147,  169 (students in self-contained  classrooms at the elementary  level receive more language-
assistance  instruction  than children  in  pull-out programs).  The debate  at this point occurs  even  at
the level of social science  measures.  See A.  COHEN,  M.  BRUCK,  F. RODRIGUEZ-BROWN,  BILINGUAL  EDU-
CATION  SERIES  6  (Center for Applied Linguistics  1982) (methodological  debates).
114.  Compare Serna  v.  Portales  Mun.  Schools,  499  F.2d  1147,  1150  (10th  Cir.  1974)  ("[New
Mexico teacher]  testified that 'until a child developed  a good self image not even teaching English as
a second  language would  be successful.  If a child  can be made to feel worthwhile  in school  then he
will learn even  with a poor English program'.") with Glazer, Pluralism  and Ethnicity, in THE  NEW BILIN-
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are considered  different without stigmatizing them or undermining their iden-
tity  becomes  a  salient  concern  in  crafting  programs  for children  whose  pri-
mary language  is not English.
This  link  between  the difference  dilemma  and  the  problem  of designing
means  and  ends  in  bilingual  education  is  highlighted  by  two  early bilingual
cases  which  made  use  of intelligence  testing  (IQ scores)  to  arrive  at  con-
trasting conceptions of how to implement the mandate of bilingual education.
In  Serna v.  Portales Municipal Schools, 115  the  district  court  found  that  IQ  test
scores  for  Spanish-surnamed  children  were  different  from  those  of  the
"average"  child in the same school system.' ' 6  The court concluded that, com-
pared  with  the  performance  of the  other  students,  the  performance  of the
Spanish-surnamed  children  was  not  what  it  should  have  been.  The  court
added that "[c]oupled  with the testimony of educational experts regarding the
negative impact  upon  Spanish-surnamed  children  when  they are placed  in  a
school atmosphere which does not adequately reflect the educational needs of
this minority,"  the evidence established  a legal  violation."1 7  In affirming,  the
Court of Appeals  for the Tenth Circuit observed  that "[i]ntelligence  quotient
tests  show  that  Lindsey  students  fall  further  behind  as  they  move from  the
first  to  the  fifth  grade."'1 8  The  district court  ordered  a  curriculum  plan  to
implement  bilingual  training  and  bicultural  outlook  programs  and  also
directed that a special effort be made to recruit and hire bilingual teachers.' 1 9
In contrast, in Otero v.  Mesa County Valley School District  No. 51, 120 the district
court  accepted  the  school  department's  theory  that  differentials  in  student
abilities,  rather  than  linguistic  deficiencies,  explained  the  educational
problems  of  Mexican-American  students. 2 1  The  court  then  rejected  the
plaintiffs'  claim  that  poor  school  performance  by  Chicano  students  occurs
because  the school district
has  created a  school system  oriented for middle  class Anglo children, has staffed  that
system  with  non-Chicano  personnel  who  do not  understand  and  cannot  relate with
Chicano  students who  are linguistically  and culturally different,  to the extent that the
Chicano  students  and  their  parents  do  not  feel  that  School  District  51  is  "their"
school. 122
GUALISM:  AN  AMERICAN  DILEMMA  55, 62-63  (M.  Ridge ed.  1981)  (pragmatic  advantages  to  assimila-
tion,  given  public  school control  of access  to higher education).
115.  351  F.  Supp.  1279  (D.N.M.  1972), afd, 499 F.2d  1147  (10th  Cir.  1974).
116.  Id. at  1281-82.
117.  Id. at  1282.  The district court relied on the equal protection clause of the Constitution.  Id.
The court of appeals  affirmed,  but  relied on Lau  v. Nichols.  See 499  F.2d at  1153.
118.  499  F.2dat  1150.
119.  Serna v.  Portales  Mun.  Schools, 351  F.  Supp.  1279,  1283  (D.N.M.  1972),  afjd, 499 F.2d
1147,  1154  (10th  Cir.  1974)  (expressing approval  of district courts'  plan).
120.  408 F. Supp.  162  (D. Colo.  1975), remanded, 568 F.2d  1312 (10th  Cir. 1977), on remand, 470
F. Supp.  326 (D.  Colo.  1979),  aftid, 628 F.2d  1271  (10th  Cir.  1980).  A useful case  study of the  suit
appears  in  M.  REBELL  & A.  BLOCK,  EDUCATIONAL  POLICY  MAKING  AND  THE  COURTS:  AN  EMPIRICAL
STUDY  OF JUDICIAL  ACTIVISM  147-74  (1982).
121.  M.  REBELL  & A.  BLOCK,  supra note  120,  at  162-63,  173-74.  The case study explains  more
explicitly than does the opinion  itself the use of IQtests.  The court also relied on achievement tests,
and on  studies of the use of Spanish in  the students'  homes.  408 F.  Supp. at  165-66.
122.  Plaintiffs'  Opening  Statement,  quoted  in  Otero,  408  F.  Supp.  162,  164  (D.  Colo.  1975).
Plantiffs  also explained  that their case would show  that "[the  cultural and linguistic makeup of Chi-
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The  district  court  rejected  the  plaintiffs'  request  for  bilingual-bicultural
instruction 123  and  the  hiring  of more bilingual  teachers. 24  The  court con-
cluded that relatively few  students had no English proficiency, and the transi-
tional English instruction  already offered  them  by  the school  district was  an
adequate means for dealing with any legal obligation the school had to elimi-
nate inequality. 125  Thus, the Otero court relied on IQtests-the very measure
used in Serna to identify  a language  barrier requiring  a remedy-to  rule out
the need  to remedy  a language barrier.' 26
What explains  this inconsistent  use of IQ  scores?  What different concep-
tions of the remedy for inequality  may be at work here?  In Serna, the scores
are  treated  as  "outcome"  measures,  capturing  the  effect  of schooling  and
therefore measuring what happens  when  schools  make the error of ignoring
student  difference.  According  to  this  view,  the  school  systems'  failure  to
create  an  environment  hospitable  to  the different  cultural,  ethnic,  and  lan-
guage  experiences  of the  Spanish-surnamed  children  produced the  discrep-
ancy  in  IQ  scores  and  justified  the  remedy  of  bilingual  and  bicultural
programming,  as well as the hiring of bilingual  teachers.  Here,  then, liability
is  founded  on the error of ignoring difference  where it exists.
Otero,  in contrast,  used  the IQ  scores  without assuming  any  pre-existing
difference  between Mexican-American  students and other students.  The dif-
ference  in  their  IQ  scores,  then,  could  be  used  to  explain  their  different
experiences  in  school,  and  to  rule  out  the  claim  for  curricular  and  staff
changes  to  address  the  identity  and  self-esteem  of the  Mexican-American
studies.  This use of the IQscores relied on a conception of the right means to
achieve the ends of bilingual education:  the right means should alter the edu-
cational  system  as  little as  possible, and deploy  short-term  intensive  English
instruction  for  the  few  students  unable  to  function  in  the  mainstream
classroom.
cano  students has  posed an  educational incompatibility  between District  51's  educational program
and the learning style of these students to the degree that they do not effectively and equally benefit
from the school's program  as compared  to Anglo  students."  Id. at  163-64.
123.  The  court  may  have  been  influenced  by the  Tenth Circuit's  decision  in Keyes  v.  School
Dist. No.  1, 521  F.2d 465,  480 (10th  Cir.  1975),  cert. denied, 423  U.S.  1066  (1976),  which  rejected  a
bilingual education  plan designed by the same expert  used in Otero; both the appellate court in Keyes
and the district court in Otero emphasized  the importance of state and local control rather  than judi-
cial intervention for dealing with the problem of minority  students.  See id. at 482; Otero, 408 F. Supp.
at  171-72;  see also Teitelbaum & Hiller, Bilingual Education:  The Legal Mandate, 47  HARV.  EDUC.  REV.
138,  151  (1977)  (discussing  Keyes and Otero.)
124.  Plaintiffs argued  that the school district's  hiring practices  produced  an environment  alien
to the Chicano  children; plaintiffs  couched  their claim as an employment  discrimination  issue.  The
district court initially rejected  plaintiffs'  employment  discrimination  claim  on the grounds  that they
lacked  standing to  assert it;  on remand  from the court of appeals,  the district court concluded  that
the  plaintiffs  failed  to establish discriminatory  intent  in the  school  district's employment  practices,
and also accepted  the school board's nondiscriminatory  reasons for statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion against Chicano job applicants.  Otero v. Mesa  County Valley  School Dist. No.  51,  470  F. Supp.
326,  327  (D.  Colo.  1979),  afd,  628  F.2d  1271  (10th  Cir.  1980).
125.  408  F.  Supp.  at  168-70.  Plaintiffs'  claims were  couched in  constitutional  terms;  the court
found  no constitutional  violation and compliance  with state and federal  statutes.
126.  The Otero court similarly relied  on standardized  English  proficiency tests,  408 F.  Supp. at
165-66.
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The link between the use of the IQscores and the implicit choice of means
for bilingual education  becomes apparent  in critiques of this testing method.
These  critiques  further expose  the difference  dilemma,  even  at  this  level  of
technical  debate about testing.  The Otero  court's reliance on IQscores could
be challenged  for failure to acknowledge the cultural and linguistic bias of the
tests  themselves. 127  In  a  sense, relying  on tests  of "intelligence"  to explain
why  students  without  English  proficiency  perform  less  well  in  school  than
other students confirms  a  tautology,  because  intelligence  is  defined  in  terms
of mastery of English language skills.  Some commentators have observed that
the  math scores of Chicano students more  closely approximate  the scores  of
Anglo  students;  this  implies  that  the greater  disparity  in  the language  arts
scores reflects difficulty with the verbal content of the tests. 128  Thus, it is pos-
sible to criticize  the Otero court for its failure to understand how ignoring pre-
existing  differences  can recreate  them.
It  is equally  important,  however,  to consider  the other side of the differ-
ence dilemma:  does focusing on difference also re-establish  it?  In particular,
starting  with  the  premise  that  IQ  tests  do  not  test  innate  ability,  the  tests
nonetheless  may  accurately  identify  those students  who are not likely  to do
well in the classroom designed  for Anglo  children.'2 9  So long as those meas-
ures of classroom success are not being challenged as discriminatory,  dispari-
ties  in the  IQ  scores support educational  programming  geared  toward those
traditional  classroom success  measures, not toward  the language  and cultural
identities of Mexican-American  children.' 30
Thus, the Otero court may well have applied a tautology by using IQscores
to explain the school  problems of Mexican-American  students, but the design
of means to solve the discrimination  problem must take into account  the real
likelihood  that  the  same  Anglo  measures  of success  will  be  applied  to  the
Mexican-American  children  at each  point throughout the  school  system, and
127.  To the extent that plaintiffs  raised this issue at trial, it was  rebutted  by the defense  expert
who  claimed his  methodology compensated  for any alleged  bias.  M.  REBELL  & A.  BLOCK, supra note
120,  at  163-64.
128.  M.  REBELL & A.  BLOCK,  supra note  120, at  163-64; cf. Hobson  v. Hansen, 269  F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C.  1967),  affd in part and appeal  dismissed in part,  sub nom. Smuck v.  Hobson, 408 F.2d  175  (D.C.
Cir.  1969)  (en banc)  (rejecting use of scholastic  aptitude tests  in assigning students to tracks due to
racial and socio-economic  impact); Light & Smith,  Social Allocation Models of Intelligence: A Methodolog-
ical Inquiry, 39  HARV.  EDUC.  REV.  484  (1969)  (bias problems  in intelligence  testing).  See generally S.
GOULD,  THE  MISMEASURE  OF MAN  (1981)  (racial,  class,  and sex bias historically expressed in theories
and  testing of intelligence);  Kirp,  Schools as Sorters:  The  Constitutional  and Policy Implications of Student
Classification, 121  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  705, 726-30  (1973)  (reviewing research  on student  classification).
129.  See  Blatt  &  Garfunkel,  Psycho-Educational Assessment,  Curriculum Development,  and  Clinical
Research with the 'Different Child', in AN  ALTERNATIVE  TEXTBOOK  IN  SPECIAL EDUCATION  277, 288 (1977)
(IQ as good  predictor of academic  success,  and  generally  used  as  such);  Goodman,  De Facto School
Segregation:  A  Constitutional and Empirical Analysis,  60  CALIF.  L.  REV.  275,  434-35  (1972)  (IQ  tests
reflect endowment and experience  and accurately identify those students unlikely to do well in main-
stream classroom).
130.  Success measures  that vary from the traditional  ones need not undercut  the commitment to
English  proficiency.  See supra note  112 and  accompanying  text  (discussing importance  of learning
English  to supporters  of bilingual-bicultural education).
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beyond.  English language and American culture will continue to measure the
students'  success  and future  opportunities.  Nathan  Glazer put it this  way:
One will never do as well in the United States living in Spanish, or French, or Yiddish,
or Chinese, as one will  do living,  learning, and working  in English.  . . . [it] is  there-
fore a naive argument to say that putting bilingual/bicultural  education  into the public
school curriculum  will make a  significant difference in affecting the general respect in
which  a given culture and  language are held.
131
Failing to acknowledge the way in which all children  in this sense are simi-
larly  situated  to  the  school criteria  for  success  could  produce  programming
that  reinforces  the  differences  of the  already  stigmatized  groups.  The  two
sides of the difference  dilemma, accordingly,  may take on competing concep-
tions  of means  and ends.  Should  we create  an enclave  of Chicano language
and culture within the school to bolster the student's self-esteem and ability to
perform  well  in  school?  The  enclave  would  include  more  teachers  with  a
background in the language and culture, and more curricular attention to and
acknowledgment of that cultural identity, even in the development of English-
language skills.  Or should we instead create limited, transitional  programs  to
give Chicano students basic language skills and then incorporate them as soon
as possible  within the classroom  designed  for the rest of the  students?
Arguments  for  and against  replicating  the  larger  community  within  the
school as the best means of preparation  are met by arguments for and against
creating  an  alternative,  tailored  environment  within  the  school  to  support
individual student development.  Replicating the larger social order within the
school would involve creating the school as a community where English is the
dominant  language  and proficiency  in  it is  not only expected,  but  is  sought
through immersion or intensive instruction;  the medium  is  the message,  and
the  school's  own  commitment  to  English  as  the  dominant  language  is
expressed through  its required  use of English in the classroom, hallways,  and
life of the school.  There  are problems with  this  approach,  however.  It may
actually  not  produce  English  proficiency  among  non-English  native
speakers. 132  It may undermine such students by  depriving them of a sense of
self-respect and identification  with school culture.  Imposing a dominant Eng-
lish  approach  in  the  school  may  reproduce  the  patterns  of economic  and
social  inequality  which  are  present  in  the  outside  community  rather  than
offering an enclave away from those hierarchies.  Such  an enclave would be a
safe  terrain where each child  would have  a chance  to succeed.
Constructing the school as an enclave, in contrast, would deploy bilingual-
bicultural programs designed to create  the same combination of comfort with
the familiar and introduction to the unfamiliar  that the majority-language  stu-
dent typically encounters  in public school.'33  This  approach, however, could
131.  Glazer, supra note  114, at 55,  63.
132.  See supra note  113 and accompanying  text (discussing studies of effectiveness  of different
programs).
133.  Many excellent  schools  are viewed  by  their staff and  students  as  enclaves  of one  sort or
another.  See S.  LIGHTFOOT,  THE  GOOD  HIGH  SCHOOL:  PORTRAITS  OF  CHARACTER  AND  CULTURE  321-
22  (1983)  (discussing  Milton  academy  and  parochial  schools);  cf.  Cover,  The  Supreme Court,  1982
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impede  the minority-language  child's  fluency in  English.  It might  also shore
up values  and attitudes  that compete  with the  culture dominant  in the larger
community and  create painful  ambivalence  in  the child.
The tension over means, then, may reveal genuine underlying tension over
the  ends of schooling.  Some  wish to use the school to transform  the society
so that different  kinds of adults  can function or succeed  within it, not just to
transform  the  individual  child  into  an  adult  capable  of functioning  in  that
society.  Clarity  or  unanimity  on  goals  would  not  resolve  the  means/ends
dilemma.  Designing the best preparation for a child entering any given vision
of the  larger community  still  involves  the dilemma  of choice  between  repli-
cating  that  vision  in  the  school  design,  or  designing  some  other  protective
environment.  Which  route  gives  the child  better  opportunities  for  growth,
development  of skills,  and the equipment for success  in whatever  society  will
greet her or him?
2.  The  Design Dilemma and Special Education.  As  with  bilingual  education,
education  for the handicapped could  take the form of giving special  students
experience  with  an  unaccommodating,  untransformed  world-minimizing
special treatment,  mixing students  with  special needs  in with  other students,
and exposing each  group to one another as  they would be outside the school.
Alternatively,  the school can be designed  to include measures  tailored for the
handicapped  child,  ranging  from  specialized  instruction  within  the  main-
stream classroom to separate classrooms or individualized schooling and eval-
uations.  Both routes run the risk of not preparing the child with special needs
for the waiting world.1
34
The  case  of Amy  Rowley,  which  was  reviewed  by  the  Supreme  Court, 135
illustrates this problem.  The case presented the Court with the following stat-
utory  interpretation  questions:  What  is  the  meaning  of the  EAHCA  term
"free appropriate  public education",  and what means would achieve the ends
of the Act  to give content  to the  term  "appropriate"?  The  Court concluded
that challenges  to  a  school  placement  brought under  this  statutory  require-
ment should be assessed according to whether (a)  the state complied with the
procedures  established  in  the  statute,
1 3 6  and  (b)  "the  individualized  educa-
tional program developed through the Act's procedures  [is] reasonably  calcu-
lated  to enable  the child to  receive  educational  benefits."' l3 7
Behind this language was the problem of devising  an educational program
for Amy  Rowley,  a  prelingually  deaf child who  attended  regular  classrooms
from  kindergarten  on.  The  individual  educational  plan  developed  by  the
Term-Foreword: NOMOS and Narrative, 97  HARV.  L.  REV.  4,  31-33  (1983)  (subgroup may  develop  a
normative  world and  seek associational  rights for self-realization in normative  terms).
134.  SeeJ.  HANDLER,  THE  DISCRETIONARY  DECISION  34  (1984).
135.  Board of Educ.  v.  Rowley, 458  U.S.  176  (1982).
136.  Id. at 207.
137.  Id. at  206-07.  The  Court  emphasized  the  nature  of the Act  as  a  grant  with  conditions
agreed  upon by participating states,  and that if  the state  has complied with the obligations imposed
by Congress  "the  courts can require no more."  Id. at 207.
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school while Amy attended  first grade provided  that her education  should be
supplemented  by  instruction  from  a  tutor  one  hour  each  day  and  from  a
speech  therapist for three hours  a week.1 38  Amy's parents objected  that this
plan  failed  to  provide  an  "appropriate"  education;  they  believed  that  she
should also be provided with a qualified sign language interpreter in all of her
classes.  The  school  countered  that Amy  did  not  need  such  an  interpreter
because she was "achieving  educationally,  academically,  and socially"  without
such  assistance.  Her  parents  maintained  that  without  an  interpreter,  Amy
understood  a maximum  of fifty-eight  to fifty-nine percent of oral  communica-
tions, but with an interpreter, her comprehension of oral communication  was
100 percent.
139
Obviously,  a major  difference in cost to the school would follow  from the
positions  taken by the school officials and by the child's parents.  In addition,
their positions reflected contrasting concepts of the means to achieve the ends
of her education.  The  school's  position  looked  to  the  child's  achievement
and, as endorsed  by the Supreme Court, asked  whether the  educational  pro-
gram was  designed  by  the school  to enable  the  child  to  receive  educational
benefits.  Because Amy's achievement levels were above average, and she was
easily  able  to  advance  from  grade  to  grade  in  mainstream  classrooms,  the
school  and  the Court  concluded  that  her educational  program  was  appro-
priate.1 40  The parents, in contrast, were committed to a method of communi-
cation for the deaf called  "total  communication,"  which involved not only lip
reading  and  speech  development,  but  also  sign  language,  fingerspelling,
touching,  and  visual  cues. 141  Without  such  complete  assistance,  they  main-
tained,  she  was  not  provided  the  same  opportunity  as  other  children  to
receive  oral communications  in  the classroom, or  to succeed  in  life.' 42
Fundamentally,  the  parents  wanted  to  create  a  special  environment  for
Amy that would adjust fully for her disability and use the special measure of a
sign-language  interpreter to provide  as much  of the educational  "inputs"  as
the  school  provided  other  students,  although  it would  be  unlikely  that  the
child would  have a sign language interpreter  with her for the  rest of her life.
The school wanted  to provide educational  services which would allow Amy to
function and achieve in the classroom setting and develop her self-sufficiency,
meaning  self-sufficiency  in  a  world  not  likely  to  accommodate  her  special
needs.14
3
138.  Id. at  184.  The plan also provided for use of an FM hearing aid which could amplify  words
spoken into  a receiver.  Amy had the ability to hear sounds in  low frequencies,  and very diminished
ability to hear sounds  in  the frequencies  of human  speech.  Brief for Respondents,  at  11-12.
139.  The Rowleys relied on tests administered by a speech and hearing expert  for these percent-
ages.  Rowley  v. Board of Educ., 483  F. Supp. 528,  532 (S.D.N.Y.  1980),  aff'd, 632  F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 458  U.S.  176  (1982).
140.  Board of Educ.  v.  Rowley,  458 U.S.  176, 209-10  (1982).
141.  Brief for Respondents,  at  2-3.
142.  Id. at  10-11,  20.
143.  See  Brief for Petitioners, at  66  (discussing legislative history  of EAHCA).  In further con-
trast, the district court had reasoned  that an "appropriate  education"  meant an opportunity for each
handicapped  child  "to  achieve  his  full  potential  commensurate  with  the  opportunity  provided  to
other children,"  Rowley v.  Board of Educ.,  483 F. Supp. 528,  534  (S.D.N.Y.  1980); thus the shortfall
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Amy Rowley's  situation does  not  seem so dire  because,  as a  gifted  child,
she was  able  to  perform  adequately  within  the  terms  set by  the  mainstream
classroom.  Nonetheless,  the  conflicting conceptions  of her educational alter-
natives  highlight  the  risks of each  possible  means of educating  her:  without
an interpreter she would miss some of the educational  opportunities afforded
her  classmates,  and,  as  a  result,  miss  the  chance  to  develop  as  fully  as  she
might; but with an interpreter she  would not be forced  to develop the ability
to function well without support in preparation for the day when such support
would be unavailable.
In response  to  these  kinds  of risks for other children  with  special needs,
some experts emphasize  educational services for handicapped students  which
are specifically designed to help them become competent in daily adult life. 144
Another strategy would supplement the special needs student's experience  in
the mainstream  classroom with sign language  interpretation,  special learning
materials,  or  weekly  tutoring.' 45   Different  educational  strategies  have
emerged  for  severely  and mildly  handicapped  children,  but risks  remain for
any child with either technique:  the student may be stigmatized  by specialized
instruction,1 46 or subjected to  a self-confirming labeling process.1 47  It is  also
possible that the student may be burdened by special services. 148  The student
from  the  handicapped  students'  potential  should  not be  greater  than  the  shortfall  from  the  non-
handicapped  students'  potential  in  their  educational  achievement.  The  difficulties  in  measuring
either student potential or the shortfall  from it doomed this standard, even though  it acknowledged
the possibility  that Amy  Rowley's  school achievements  despite her  handicap reflected  potential  for
even greater achievement.
144.  I.  AMARY, THE RIGHTS  OF THE  MENTALLY  RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY  DISABLED  TO  TREAT-
MENT  AND  EDUCATION  71  (1980)  (urging social  relations,  personal  grooming,  personal  safety,  and
transportation curriculum  for developmentally disabled).
145.  SeeJ. HANDLER,  supra note  134,  at 3-4,  9-10  (special  education  programs  supplementing
classroom  instruction  with  remedial help,  resource rooms, and  consulting experts).  Massachusetts,
for example, developed  ten "prototype"  placements  based on the degree  to which  modifications  of
the  mainstream  classroom  program  are  made.  Thus,  the  prototypes  are:  (1)  regular  classroom
instruction  with some modifications;  (2)  an educational  program at the regular school  with no more
than 25  percent  of the  time spent  in  special education  classes;  (3)  an  educational  program  at the
regular  school  with  no more  than 60 percent  of the time  in  special education  classes;  (4) a  special
class  placement  within  the regular  school setting but mostly  separate from  the regular educational
programming;  (5)  a special private day school program;  (6) teaching or treatment at home or (7)  in a
hospital;  (8)  occupational  training  in  a  public  school;  (9)  teaching  or  treatment  in  a  residential
school;  and (10)  combinations  of the previous  possibilities.  See MASSACHUSETrS  ADVOCACY  CENTER,
MAKING  SCHOOL  WORK:  AN  EDUCATION  HANDBOOK  FOR  STUDENTS,  PARENT  AND  PROFESSIONALS  48
(rev.  ed.  1975); see alsoJ. SHRYBMAN,  supra note 41,  at 26-129  (describing continuum of educational
services ranging from  least  to  most restrictive).
146.  Kirp,  Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 46, at 45-46.
147.  See Bogdan  & Taylor,  The Judged, Not the Judges: An Insider's View of Mental Retardation, in  AN
ALTERNATIVE  TEXTBOOK  IN  SPECIAL EDUCATION  217,  228, 230-31  (1977)  (mentally retarded  individual
describes  impact of label on his  sense of his own  abilities).  This problem  may be  particularly  acute
for the doubly different child who is a member of both a racial or ethnic minority and a handicapped
or special  education  subgroup:  "When  a  child  from  a  deprived  background  is  treated  as  if he  is
uneducable because he has a low test score, he becomes  uneducable and the low test score is thereby
reinforced."  Hobson  v.  Hansen  269 F.  Supp. 401,  484 (D.D.C.  1967)  (quoting Kenneth  Clark).
148.  One child  reportedly progessed better academically  and socially when  psychological  serv-
ices  and  tutoring  were  suspended  and  the  academic  lessons  were  programmed  for  his  level  and
graded less strictly.  Sarason,  Levine, Goldenberg, Cherlin & Bennett, Translating  Psychological  Concepts
into Action,  in AN  ALTERNATIVE  TEXTBOOK  IN  SPECIAL EDUCATION  233, 252-53  (1977).LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
may also  fail to learn how to function effectively  outside the setting  of a spe-
cially  designed school.  Consider  this episode:  An  instructor in  a residential
school  for blind children points out the mantel of a fireplace to a child who is
about to bang his head on it.  The child says,  "Why  don't you put some pad-
ding  on  it?  This  is  a  school  for  the  blind,  we  could  hurt  ourselves."  The
instructor  replies,  "There  won't  be  padding  outside  the  school  when  you
leave here." 149  Not padding the mantelpiece  at the school  for the blind may
train  the blind  students  to  be  wary  about  such  hazards;  it  may  also  permit
accidents  within  the school.
Nevertheless,  designing  programs  that  do  not tailor  the  school  environ-
ment or educational  plans to the special needs of the students could similarly
perpetuate  their  disabilities.  The  student  may  fail  to develop  the  ability  to
function,  with  or without  special  assistance.  Also,  integration  into  a  main-
stream classroom  may produce  less sensitivity  to  individual  student needs. 50
In  this  light,  some  thoughtful  observers  have  urged  that  classification  and
placement  decisions  should  explicitly address  "facts  concerning possible  dis-
advantages  resulting from special  classification"  as well  as student needs  and
school system  resources.'
5 '  The risks of stigmatization  from  special services
and  continual reliance  on special  assistance  arise  if negative attitudes  toward
handicaps  persist in the larger community, and if the adult worlds of employ-
ment,  housing,  and  transportation  fail  to  accommodate  people  with  special
needs.  Yet  the  dilemma  of how  best  to achieve  preparation  for adulthood
remains,  whatever vision of the evolving society underlies  the means selected.
3.  Designing Means and Ends:  Minorities and the  Difference Dilemma.  The  fol-
lowing  episodes  further  illustrate  the  design  problem  in  the  treatment  of
varied  minority groups by educational  institutions:
-In  an all-black urban school, one teacher advises another not to bring up
slavery while discussing the cotton gin.  She said, without malice and only with
an expression of the most intense and honest affection for the children  in the
class:  "  'I  don't want  these children to have to think back on this year later on
and  to  have  to  remember  that  we  were  the  ones  who  told  them  they  were
Negro.'  "152
149.  An exchange like this occurs in a children's book about a  boy who becomes blind. J. GAR-
FIELD,  FOLLOW  My  LEADER  (1957);  see also  Unwanted Help, N.Y.  Times,  Sept.  16,  1984,  at 49,  col.  1
(Association  for  the  Blind  oppose  university  developed  electronic  guidance  system  because  the
system  would  discourage blind students from developing their own  senses).
150.  Blatt,  The Integration-Segregation  Issue:  Some Questions, Assumptions, and Facts, in AN  ALTERNA-
TIVE  TEXTBOOK  IN  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  128-29  (1977)  (describing this view and  lack of evidence  on
either side).
151.  Kirp,  Buss  & Kuriloff, supra note 46,  at  137.
152.  J. KoZOL,  DEATH  AT AN  EARLY AGE:  THE DESTRUCTION  OF  THE HEARTS  AND  MINDS  OF NEGRO
CHILDREN  IN  THE  BOSTON  PUBLIC  SCHOOLS  68  (1968).  Kozol continues:
The amount of difficulty involved in telling children they are Negro, of course, is proportional to
the degree of ugliness which  is attached to that word within a person's mind...  What she was
afraid of was to be remembered  as the one who told them that they were what  they are .. . . To
be  taught by a  teacher who felt that  it would be wrong to  let them know it must have left a silent
and  deeply working  scar.  The  extension to children  of the fears  and  evasions  of a  teacher  is
probably  not very uncommon,  and  at  times  the  harm  it does  is  probably  trivial.  But  when  it
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-A  rehabilitation  program  for drug  addicts  creates  a supportive,  struc-
tured  residential  setting,  emphasizing  honesty,  affection,  consistency,  and
respect  for self and others.  Students in the program develop  skills  in honest
communication,  empathy,  and collaboration.  On entering  the workplace,  the
students  discover that these  skills are not rewarded and may  even hinder suc-
cess.  Frank  conversation  and  cooperative  concern  for  others  collide  with
workplace values  separating public and private life and emphasizing  competi-
tion and individual success.  Moreover, taking  cues  from  others at  the work-
place,  the program's  students  resort back to escapist  and destructive ways  of
dealing  with their emotions-such  as drug use.153
As  these  episodes  suggest,  constructing  an  environment  to  prepare  stu-
dents for success  outside  of it poses  risks  of failure  within  the  training envi-
ronment and  failure outside  of it.  Steps to  avoid  failure  within the learning
environment  may  increase  chances  of  failure  outside,  but  recreating  the
outside  environment  for  the  purpose  of training  increases  the  risks  inside.
Not confronting race  issues  within  the school  may protect  the students  from
some discomfort  during  the  school hours, but will not  prepare them  for the
hostility about race they  will encounter outside  the school.  Creating an alter-
native  environment of support and  honesty within  a drug rehabilitation  pro-
gram  may  strengthen  participants  so  that  they can  enter  the job world,  but
their new-found strength may depend on support and honesty which is absent
and  even  rejected  at the workplace.
Shielding  a  minority  child  from  community  dislike  may  allow  her  to
develop a sense of self-esteem but disable her from recognizing hostility when
it  comes her way.  In her autobiography,  the  black poet Audre  Lorde recalls
racial  tension  on the  streets of New York when  she was  growing up:
As a  very little girl,  I remember shrinking  from a particular  sound, a  hoarsely  sharp,
guttural rasp, because it often meant a nasty glob of grey spittle upon  my coat or shoe
an instant later.  My mother wiped it off with the little pieces of newspaper she always
carried in her purse.  Sometimes  she fussed about low-class people who had no better
sense nor manners  than to spit into  the wind no matter where they went,  impressing
upon me  that  this  humiliation  was  totally random.  It never occurred  to me to doubt
her.  It was not until years  later once in conversation  I said to her:  "Have  you noticed
people don't spit into the wind  so much  the way  they used to?"  And the look on my
mother's face told me that I had blundered  into one of those secret places of pain  that
must  never be spoken  of again.'
54
Professor  Catherine MacKinnon  commented  on  this  incident:  "Which  is
worse:  to protect the child from knowing that she is the object of degradation
by some members  of the  community, or to alert her and prepare her to deal
with  that attitude  when  it  comes  her  way?"1 55  But  these  problems  arise  not
comes  to a matter of denying to a  class of children  the color of their skin  and of the very  word
that designates  them, then I think that  it  takes  on the proportions of a  madness.
Id. at 68-69  (emphasis in original).
153.  Bookbinder,  Educational  Goals and Schooling in  a Therapeutic Community, 45 HARV.  EDUC.  REV.
71,  80-83  (1975).
154.  A.  LORDE,  ZAMI:  A  NEW  SPELLING  OF  MY  NAME  17-18  (1982).
155.  Lecture  by  Professor  Catherine  MacKinnon  at  Harvard  Law  School  (January  1983).  Of
course, experience  with community hostility  may itself be the best educator, but this  too could work
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just  for  children  who  are  in  some  way  different  from  other  children.  The
means/ends  problem,  and its relation  to the  dilemma of difference,  recurs  in
more general questions about treating all children,  as the following  examples
of first amendment  issues in public  schools indicate.
4.  The  First Amendment  and Schooling.  In  the  context  of free  speech  and
freedom of expression issues, the courts rely on a view of the school's mission
as preparing students  for participation in a political community committed  to
freedom of expression and wide ranging exchange of views.  The courts, how-
ever,  also  embrace  a  view  of  the  school's  special  function,  clientele,  and
problems  that may be incompatible  with free  expression  and a wide  ranging
exchange  of views  within  the  school  itself.  Judicial  ambivalence  about  the
reach of first amendment  protections  within  the school  displays  the dilemma
over  how  to design  the means  of schooling  to  advance  its  ends.  Thus,  the
Supreme Court  has declared  that students  do not "shed  their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech.  . . at the schoolhouse gate,"  1 56  and "[t]he  class-
room  is  peculiarly  the  'marketplace  of ideas'."' 157  According  to  this  view,
there is an identity between means and ends; "[t]hat  [school boards] are edu-
cating the young for citizenship  is reason  for scrupulous protection of Consti-
tutional freedoms of the individual, if we  are not to strangle the free mind at
its  source  and  teach  youth to  discount  important  principles  of our govern-
ment as  mere platitudes."'
158
At the same time, the Supreme Court has expressed solicitude for the spe-
cial  vulnerabilities  of children  and the  "special  characteristics  of the school
environment."'' 59  According  to  this  view,  schools  should  be  authorized  to
socialize  young  people,  to  inculcate  habits  of good  'citizenship  and  values
associated with the democratic political system.  Free expression issues should
be treated differently in the schools than in the larger community; student and
teacher  speech  may  need  to  be  restricted,  curricula  may  be  constructed  to
select  ideas and  values  to accomplish  the  task of socialization.  The  means,
then,  for  preparing young  people  to  participate  in  the  open  debate  in  the
adult  community  could  recreate  the  same  open  debate  in  the  schools  or
arrange  a  more  restricted  and  controlled  exchange  of ideas  framed  by  the
the other way.  This issue has arisen in the context of challenges to the custody of a child by a lesbian
mother;  some  argue  that  the  experience  of community  intolerance  will  injure  the  child.  E.g.,
Townend  v. Townend,  1 FAM.  L. REP.  (BNA)  2830, 2831  (Ohio Ct. Com.  Pleas,  1975).  Others sug-
gest that the experience itself could  strengthen the  children:
It  is just as  reasonable to expect that  they will emerge better equipped to search  out their own
standards of right and wrong,  better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its
moral judgments, and better able  to understand the importance  of conforming their beliefs to
the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular senti-
ment or prejudice.
M.P.  v.  S.P.,  169 NJ.  Super. 425,  438, 404  A.2d  1256,  1263 (1979).
156.  Tinker v.  Des Moines  Indep. Community  School Dist.,  393  U.S.  503,  506  (1969).
157.  Keyishian  v. Board  of Regents, 385  U.S.  589,  603  (1967).
158.  West  Virginia State Bd.  of Educ. v.  Barnette, 319  U.S.  624,  637 (1943).
159.  See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457  U.S.  853, 868 (1982)  (opinion ofJustice Brennan)  (quoting
Tinker); Tinker v.  Des Moines Indep.  Community  School Dist.,  393 U.S.  503, 506  (1969).
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school officials and  guarding against disorder within the school. 160  The judi-
ciary  wants  to allow  school  officials  to  arrange a protected  environment and
yet it also wants  to avoid  the apparent restrictions on first amendment  activi-
ties within  the school  that this  protected  enclave  notion would implement.
The Supreme Court's consideration  of this subject in Board of Education v.
Pico,  161  reveals  persistent  disagreement  on  these issues;  the  seven  separate
opinions diverge on  this means/ends question.  Some members  of the  Court
seem to endorse the view that the better means for preparing students for the
adult  community  is  to have  them experience  the  marketplace  of ideas  in the
school  setting;  other  members  of the  Court favor  inculcation  of norms  and
values  by  the  school  in  a  setting  protected  from  expression  which  school
boards find  objectionable.
162
This  first  amendment  problem  suggests  the  complications  in  devising
means  to  ends  in  schooling;  creating  a  sheltered  environment  may  not pre-
pare students to handle the range of expression  they will encounter as adults,
but students  may  not be ready  to handle  some  expression  permitted  in  the
adult world.  In  a sense, then, the problem of schooling is itself a problem of
designing means for the end of preparing students for what awaits them.  The
creation  of either  an  enclave  or a  microcosm  of the  awaiting  world  carries
risks.  This  problem  of design  derives  from  the dilemma  of difference:  it  is
because children are considered different from adults that the need for a spe-
cial  environment  arises,  but  it  is  because  they  are  also  not  to  be  excluded
ultimately  from  the world of adults  that they need some  experience with the
world  awaiting  them.  The  problem  highlights  ambivalent  attitudes  about
whether  children are already more like  or more unlike  adults with respect  to
either  their  abilities  to  handle  free  expression  or  their entitlement  to enjoy
and learn from it.  They are, at the same time, different and similar to us,  and
on  the route to becoming  like us.
Conceiving  of children  as  potential  adults  does  not resolve  the  ambiva-
lence because  this conception  could support either denying children  the free
expression  rights  of adults  until  they  become  adults,  or  granting  children
those  rights  in  deference  to  what  they  will  become.  A  child's  potential  to
become  like  an  adult  may  seem  less  problematic  than  the  potential  of the
160.  See Tinker v.  Des  Moines  Indep. Community  School Dist., 393  U.S.  503,  509,  524  (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting)  (modify  first amendment  protections  in  light of risks of school  disruption).
161.  457  U.S.  853  (1982).
162.  Compare id. at 863-68  (opinion of Justice Brennan, joined  by Justice  Marshall  and Justice
Stevens)  with  id. at  879-80  (opinion  of  Justice  Blackmun)  and id. at 886-93  (dissenting  opinion  of
Chief Justice Burger, joined  by Justices  Powell,  Rehnquist  and  O'Connor)  and id. at  894-85  (dis-
senting opinion  of  Justice Powell) and id. at 908-10  (dissenting opinion  of Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice  Powell).  Although all  the opinions make  reference  to both the
students' first amendment rights and the school board's legitimate  socialization function,  the identifi-
cation  of a  "right  to  receive"  ideas  by Justice  Brennan's  opinion marks  a  commitment  to  access
within the school context to ideas expressed in the larger community; the rejection of this idea by the
other  opinions  marks  a  contrasting  view  of the school  as  a more  protected  enclave.  For  general
discussions of the tensions between  the socialization and free expression  issues  in schooling, see  S.
ARONS,  COMPELLING  BELIEF:  THE  CULTURE  OF  AMERICAN  SCHOOLING  65-74  (1983);  van  Geel,  The
Search for Constitutional  Limits  on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth,  62  TEX.  L.  REV.  197  (1983).
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handicapped  or  non-English-proficient  child  to  become  like  the  nonhandi-
capped or English-proficient  child.  But in a real sense, the debate over means
and ends  in schooling suggests that the dilemma of difference arises for all of
them.  It is a very similar problem in each case:  does treating the different one
as  though he or she  were  not different  promote sameness  or confirm  differ-
ence?  Focusing on means  and ends deepens rather than avoids  this  problem.
B.  Constraining  School Power:  The  Difference  Dilemma  Recurs
Another  possible  approach  to  the  difference  dilemma  would  seek  legal
constraints  to  curb  school  power and  guard  against the  risk  that the  school
may cause or exacerbate  stigma for "different"  students.  Two  related strate-
gies for constraining school  power arise  in the contexts  of bilingual and  spe-
cial  education:  (1)  using  other  agencies  (courts,  school  departments,  state
and federal agencies)  to check the exercise of school power, and (2)  according
students  and their parents procedural  rights  to participate in  schooling  deci-
sions.  Such strategies  have commonly been identified  as the "legalization"  of
school  problems. 1 63
1.  External  Checks  on  School  Power.  The  first  strategy  underlies  the  pio-
neering litigation in Lau, Mills, and PARC, 164 in seeking judicial supervision  of
school treatment of non-English speaking and handicapped children.  Federal
and state  legislative  efforts led to further external review of school decisions.
Thus,  the  federal Justice  Department  and  state  departments  of education
become  involved  in  local  school  treatment  of special  children  by  promul-
gating regulations  and developing  programs.  This  very  strategy of external
regulation of schools, however, puts in issue the allocation of power over edu-
cational policy  and programming.  Discussions of this power allocation ques-
tion  appear in judicial opinions  about bilingual  education.
In Otero, for example, the district court bolstered its denial of the plaintiffs'
request  for bilingual  programs  by  express  deference  to  the  school  district,
which the  court felt was "making  a real effort."' 165  The judge added  that:  "I
could  do no better, and  I do  not believe  that  a federal judge should  step  in
where  the  school  board and  the school  officials  are  doing their best  and are
doing a  good job." 166
The  Tenth  Circuit  reasoned  similarly  in  Keyes  v.  School  District No.  1,
although it was  the state legislature, as  well as the local schools,  that received
the court's  deference:
163.  See  Neal & Kirp, supra note  105; Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority,
and Organization Theory:  Implementing Due Process  for Students in the Public Schools,  1981  Wis. L. REV.  891,
894-98; see also Kirp, Proceduralism  and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28  STAN.  L.  REV. 841,
859-76  (1976)  (discussing proceduralism).
164.  See supra, notes  47-48 and accompanying  text (discussing Lau v.  Nichols,  Mills v.  Board of
Educ.,  and  Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded  Children  v.  Commonwealth).
165.  Otero  v.  Mesa  County Valley School  Dist.  No.  51,  408 F.  Supp.  162,  171  (D. Colo.  1975),
vacated, 568  F.2d  1312  (10th  Cir.  1977).
166.  Id.
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The policy of the  state of Colorado  is  to encourage  local  school  districts  to develop
bilingual  skills and to assist in the transition  of non-English-speaking  students  to Eng-
lish.  The state legislature has  established a comprehensive program  for the education
of children of migrant workers  and has mandated  the teaching of minority group his-
tory and  culture in all public schools.  . . .We believe  that the district  court's adop-
tion  [of  a  different  plan]  would  unjustifiably  interfere  with  such  state  and  local
attempts  to  deal with  the  myriad  economic,  social,  and philosophical  problems  con-
nected  with the education  of minority students.
16 7
In  contrast,  other  courts  prescribed  bilingual  programs  and  reviewed  the
implementation  of programs  mandated  by  statute. 168
Of course, both in the cases where courts approve  school board decisions
and those where  they supplant them, the problems  of constructing programs
which  do  not create  or  recreate  stigma  for  the  "different"  student  remain.
One court  acknowledged  the complexity:
[1]ittle  could be more clear  to the Court than the need  .. .for special education con-
sideration to be given to the Mexican-American  students in assisting them in adjusting
to those parts of their new  school environment  which present a cultural and linguistic
shock.  Equally  clear, however,  is the need to avoid  the creation of a stigma of inferi-
ority akin  to the "badges  and indicia of slavery"....169
The court  called upon the Anglo-American  students "to  adjust to  their Mex-
ican-American  classmates, and to learn to understand and appreciate their dif-
ferent  linguistic  and  cultural  attributes."
1 7 0  But  there is  nothing  about  the
court's  power,  compared  with  the  school's  power,  that  would  make  this
adjustment  less problematic.  The  injection of the power  allocation  problem
- between  federal  and  state  governments,  and  between  school  boards  and
other  entities  - thus  can  become  an  issue  in  legal  arguments,  but  not  a
replacement for the  choices presented  by  the difference  dilemma.1 71
167.  Keyes  v.  School Dist. No.  1, 521  F.2d 465,  482 (10th  Cir.  1975),  cert. denied, 423 U.S.  1066
(1976).  Special education  triggers similar discussion by courts, but the structure of the  EAHCA as a
federal  grants  program  with  stipulations  accepted  by  participating  states  frames  these discussions.
See,  e.g.,  Board  of Educ. v.  Rowley, 458  U.S.  176,  203,  208-09  (1982).
168.  Serna v.  Portales  Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d  1147-(10th  Cir.  1974)  (approving district court's
detailed plan); United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24  (E.D. Tex.  1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1972) (detailing comprehensive  plan for curriculum, instructional methodology, and staff treatment);
see also Martin  Luther King Jr. Elementary  School Children  v. Ann Arbor  School Dist., 473 F.  Supp.
1371  (E.D.  Mich.  1979)  (requiring school  board  to  take  steps  to  help teachers  recognize  students
used  to  "Black  English").
169.  United States  v.  Texas,  342  F.  Supp. at 28.
170.  Id.
171.  The  state  and  federal  governments,  including  the judiciary,  legislative,  and  executive
branches  of the  governments  at these  two  levels,  have  become  involved  with  bilingual  and  special
education.  Justicial  decrees,  administrative  rules, and  legislative enactments  each  contribute  to  the
legal  complexity  in  bilingual  and  special  education  programming.  This  governmental  complexity
may  serve  to modulate  change  through  the existing  structures  of power, checking  each other and
balancing competing conceptions  of program directions.  The results divert attention from substance
to the battle for control, but the legal rhetoric effectively frames  policy debates in terms of a govern-
ment designed  to have  limited power and  intended  to provide  for orderly change.  This legal struc-
ture  thus resembles  the central  devices  of the  Constitution which  divide  power in  order  to  create
processes of decisionmaking  which will  prevent tyranny; thus,  the Constitution  contemplates  a two-
tiered  federal  and state  government and  also  separated  but shared  powers  among  the branches  at
each level.  Protecting these structures  of divided power sets in motion a rhetoric of decisionmaking
such that controversial  matters involve  different centers  of authority,  contributing their perspectives
to the problem and preventing any other center of authority from having the sole word.  The Consti-
tution's commitment to due process,  as interpreted  by the Supreme Court, similarly engages govern-
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2.  Due Process Checks on  School Power.  The  second  strategy  for constraining
the power of the school grants students and parents procedural  rights to par-
ticipate in schooling decisions and  to invoke review by higher state or federal
authorities.  This  strategy  notably  characterizes  special  education.1 72  To
some extent, this due process  solution to the difference dilemma stems from a
conviction that  granting students  and their parents opportunities  for partici-
pation can reduce  or obviate  the risks  of stigmatization  in  the assessment  of
educational needs  and  assignment  of educational  placements.  According  to
this  view,  the  opportunities  for  children  and  parents  to  check  the  school's
decision, and  simply  to be  acknowledged  in  the  decisional  process  mitigate
the danger that the school's decision will create or exacerbate stigma either by
noting or failing  to note  the child's  special  needs.  This procedural  solution
does  not  entirely  eliminate  this  danger;  the  substance  of the  educational
placement  still  will pose  these risks.
To some extent, reliance  on procedures,  like hearings, paper submissions,
and bureaucratic  review,  may  divert  the  attention  of teachers,  parents,  and
policymakers  from substance  to procedure.  In terms of the  statutory  frame-
work of special  education,  the  substantive  dimensions  are  overshadowed  by
the rigor of its  procedural requirements.  Once a  special education  case pro-
gresses  to  a  courtroom,  the  focus  will  likely  emphasize  procedure:  the
Supreme Court  so prescribed in  reasoning that:
[t]he congressional  emphasis  upon full participation of concerned parties  throughout
the development  of the IEP,  as well as  the requirements that state and  local plans  be
submitted  to  the Secretary  for approval,  demonstrates  the  legislative  conviction  that
adequate compliance with the procedures  prescribed would in most cases  assure much
if not all of what  Congress wished  in the way  of substantive  content  in an IEP.1
7 3
Further,  the  use  of  procedural  due  process  in  special  education  may
expose another  version  of the difference  dilemma.  The hearing  and  appeal
structure introduces  an adversarial  mode to the  educational  placement  deci-
sion.  This can  cast the child and  the child's parents in  the roles  of outsiders
or complainers-stigmatized  roles-even  as  they  seek  to use  the  process  to
challenge  an  educational  placement  or to  seek additional  benefits.  Once  in
the  legal mode,  school  personnel  may  respond  with legalistic  maneuvers. 174
Of course,  not invoking  the  procedural  protections  could  leave parents  and
mental actors  in processes of decisionmaking that take time, require participation  by different actors,
and occasion  review  by other officials.
172.  This  marks  a  significant  point  of contrast  between  special  education,  which  makes  the
placement  decision  on an individualized  basis, and bilingual  education,  which  usually makes  educa-
tional  programming  decisions  on the classroom  or school-wide  level.  This  contrast  may  be impor-
tant for many  purposes,  but neither  route is  more effective in  avoiding or resolving the dilemma  of
difference.
173.  Board  of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.  176, 206  (1982).  In a sense, the procedural  emphasis
of the governing  statute converts  school  districts  into veritable jurisdictions  that promulgate  rules,
conduct hearings, and participate in the elaborate process of review-and this legal framework  incor-
porates the school into the governmental  structure and culture that connects local, state, and federal
legal institutions.
174.  See  M.  BUDOFF  & A.  ORENSTEIN,  SPECIAL  EDUCATION  APPEALS HEARINGS:  THEIR  FORM,  AND
THE  RESPONSE TO  THEIR  PARTICIPANTS  (1979); see also Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 46, at  128-36
(legal procedures  and  possibility that school personnel  view  parents as  burden).
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child with an undesirable placement decision or with a failure by the school to
undertake  an  assessment  and  select  a  placement.  Again,  inattention  by  the
school  could create a problem, but attention  by the school could also create a
problem  for the child.
It  is  also possible,  however,  that school  personnel  will  take  advantage of
the legally-mandated  procedures to include parents and children in a collabo-
rative process  that builds trust over time.' 75  Nothing in the adoption of pro-
cedural  due process,  however,  assures  or even  promotes this result.  Indeed,
the use of procedural due process presents  a governmental norm in contrast
to  a  trusting and  caretaking  norm that  may  otherwise  dominate  school per-
sonnel's conceptions  of their power.  The tension between  these two kinds  of
norms  can  be  identified  as  the  tension  between  models of state  power and
family  power.  It  is  a  tension  that  has  occupied  other  efforts  to  check  the
power  of schools.  Schematically,  legal  conceptions  of family  power presume
that  the  persons  in  power,  parents,  act  with  love,  focus  on  the  individual
needs  of actual  persons,  and  depend  on  mutual  trust  and continuity.  State
power,  in  contrast,  is  clothed  in  neutrality,  generality,  and  equal  treatment
regardless  of  individual  identity,  is  dependent  on  official  earmarks  of
authority,  and is exercised with restraint and distance.  As one scholar put the
prevailing  wisdom:
[A] government  succeeds when it acts dispassionately,  avoids nepotism,  and  treats all
citizens  in the same way.  Conversely, a family succeeds when it acts lovingly,  favors its
own,  and  accepts  each  member  without reservation.  The  one institution,  then, pro-
vides justice,  while the second  offers  acceptance. 1
7 6
In short,  the power exercised  by  the parent is  presumed  to be committed  to
the interest  of the child;  the  parent's  and child's  positions toward  the  world
are presumptively  compatible  and  mutually beneficial.  The power  exercised
by  the state, however,  is  presumed to be contrary  to the interests  of the  pri-
vate individual and must be justified, limited,  and bounded.  Accordingly,  dif-
ferent  legal  constraints  apply  when  parents  act  and when  the  state acts;  the
state is constrained  by the requirements  of due process and equal protection,
while the parents  are restrained  only by  the state's own concern that parents
love and  not abuse  their children.
When  constraining  school  power  is  the  issue,  the  contrast  between  the
family and state models of power comes  to the fore.  In the space of two years,
the Supreme Court adopted first the model of state power and then the model
of parental  power in constraining  the nature and limits of school disciplinary
power.  In  Goss  v.  Lopez,' 77  the  Court  concluded  that  when  a  public  school
seeks  to  discipline  a  child  by  suspension  from  school,  constitutional  rules
175.  J.  HANDLER, supra note  134, at ch. 4 (study of Madison, Wisconsin special education  experi-
ence).  Handler  describes  a collaborative  decisionmaking  process  in which  conflict  is  treated  as  an
occasion  for sharing  information.  Handler  also  notes  that  the  roots  of this process  antedate  the
introduction  of procedural  due  process by the  legal initiatives  in  special education.
176.  Stiehm, Government and the Family: Justice and Acceptance, in CHANGING  IMAGES  OF  THE  FAMILY
361,  362 (1979).
177.  419  U.S. 565  (1975).
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which  constrain  state  withdrawals  of entitlements  apply,  and  therefore  the
suspension  must  be  accompanied  by  a  due  process  hearing.'78   Here  the
Court  viewed the  school's  power as  state power:
The authority  possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in
its schools,  although concededly  very broad, must be exercised consistently with con-
stitutional  safeguards.  Among other  things,  the  State  is constrained  to  recognize  a
student's legitimate  entitlement  to a  public  education as  a property  interest  which  is
protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken  away for misconduct
without adherence  to the minimum  procedures  required  by  that Clause.' 
79
Thus the  Court ordered adherence  to the devices  constructed  by the  Consti-
tution  for restraining  arbitrary  governmental  activity  and  for affording  indi-
viduals confronted with adverse governmental decisions with opportunities  to
be  heard and  to present a  defense.'
80
Two years later, in Ingraham v.  Wright,  181  the Court considered the applica-
tion of the due process clause  to school discipline  accomplished  by  paddling
students,18 2  and  opted  for  the  parental  conception  of school  power.  The
Court  identified  a  common  law  privilege  entitling  public  schools  to  use  of
corporal  punishment,  even  though  the  Court  acknowledged  that  the  child
retained  the liberty  interests  identified  in  Goss. 183  The Court concluded  that
the  cost  of interposing  due  process  hearing  opportunities  between  student
and  teacher  outweighed  the  value  of  the  use  of  corporal  punishment
unhindered  by such  procedures.  The Court  also  relied on the  availability  of
subsequent tort actions  such as  suing the school authorities  over punishment
"later  found  to  have been excessive-not  reasonably believed  at the time  to
be necessary for the child's discipline or training ......  184  In so concluding,
the Court effectively  adopted  a conception  of the school's  power as parental
power.  Parents, too, enjoy  a common  law privilege to physically punish  their
children;  parents,  too,  need  not  comply  with  due  process  requirements  in
meting  out  such punishment;  and  parents,  too,  may be held  liable in  subse-
quent actions for damages where  the punishment was  excessive.' 8 5
178.  See id.  at 574  (suspension could  damage child's reputation  and interest  in the educational
benefits,  so some process is due preferably before  or within a reasonable  time following suspension;
formal  adversarial  hearing,  however,  not required).
179.  Id..  The  Court  also  considered  the  claim  that  due  process  was  required  to  protect  the
child's  liberty  interest  and reputation.
180.  The Court  did  suggest  that  this  approcah  can  and  should  be  made  compatible  with  the
teaching  process:
further formalizing the suspension  process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may
not only make it  too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part
of the teaching  process.
Id. at  583.  This apparently  was  a large  concern  for the dissenters.  They  viewed  the  teacher  as  at
times  a "parent-substitute"  and discipline as an educational  lesson, and rejected due process guaran-
tees as  a  challenge  to  the teacher's  authority.  The dissent also  conceived  of the classroom  as  "the
laboratory  in which  this lesson of life is best learned;"  thus conceiving of the means of schooling as
both  like  the larger community and  different from  it.  Id. at 594.
181.  430  U.S.  651  (1977).
182.  The  plaintiff also  raised  an eighth  amendment  claim.  Id. at  658.
183.  Id. at 676.
184.  Id. at 677.
185.  See,  e.g.,  Gillett  v.  Gillett,  168  Cal.  App.  2d  102,  104-07,  335  P.2d  736,  737-39  (1959)
(parent  civilly  liable  for  willful tort  of battery  of child);  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TORTS  §§  147,
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The dissenters  in  Ingraham argued  that  this  decision  departed  from  the
usual rules that apply  to state power and  state threatened  deprivations  of lib-
erty  in  such  areas  as  traffic  regulations  and prisons.' 86  However,  it was  this
notion that school power is like state power in other contexts that was rejected
by  the majority.
Accentuated  by  the short time lapse between  the  two  opinions,  the  disa-
greement  over  school  discipline  dramatizes  the  tension  between  competing
concepts  of what  constraints  there  should  be  on  power  when  the  public
schools  act. 187  In a  sense, the  model  of state power,  requiring due process,
implies  that the child  is in  opposition to the school and in need of the fullest
set of governmental  rules  to guard  against undue exercises  of governmental
power.  The alternate model of parental  power implies  that the child is not in
opposition  to  the  school  but  on  the same  side,  and  governmental  rules  to
constrain the school's power are only needed in exceptional circumstances.188
Both  models  conceive  of the  disciplinary problem  as  with  the individual
child, rather than  in the  relationship between the child and other children or
the  school staff.'8 9  The judicial ambivalence about  which conception  should
govern  in  the  schools  resembles  the  treatment  of first  amendment  issues.
Again, the  special status  of children  as potential adults-but not yet adults-
seems  to complicate their legal treatment.  As both like us and unlike us, chil-
dren pose  a discomfiting  problem.  We  may  treat them as  though they  were
adults  in  designing  disciplinary  procedures  in  school,  but their  compulsory
presence  in  school  signals  our view  that they are unlike adults.  At  the same
time,  denying  children  the  kinds  of  treatment  adults  would  deserve  if
threatened  with  punishment  also  sits  uncomfortably.  The unsettled  choice
150-55  (1966)  (parents privileged  to use reasonable force  to control  or educate  child, but excessive
punishment that  is unnecessarily  degrading or inflicts serious or permanent  harm is not privileged);
see also  Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits:  Preserving  the Victim's Remedy,  7  HARV.  WOMEN'S
L.J.  189,  189-90  (1984)  (discussing child's  tort remedies  for  incest).  The  state may  seek  criminal
sanctions against the abusive parent, again as  a legal measure  taken after the fact of parental action.
See,  e.g.,  CAL.  PENAL  CODE  § 273a(2) (West  1970  & Supp.  1985)  (child abuse as misdemeanor when
committed  by any person);  CAL.  WELF.  & INST.  CODE  § 300  (West Supp.  1984)  (court may  adjudge
child  to be dependent of the court if parents unwilling or incapable of providing care or control or if
home  unfit due  to parents'  abuse or  neglect).
186.  See  430  U.S.  at 696  (White, J.,  dissenting).  The  Supreme Court  split  the difference  in  its
recent  decision  that  students  do  enjoy fourth  amendment  protections  against  searches  by  school
officials,  but this constitutional constraint may be satisfied by the lower standard of "reasonableness"
rather  than probable  cause.  New Jersey v. T.L.O.,  53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4086-88  (U.S. Jan.  15,  1985).
187.  The same dilemma underlies the historical rise and fall of a specialized juvenile court over
the  course  of  the  last  80  years.  Progressive  era  reformers  advanced  parens patriae-the state  as
parent-as  the theory  to  support a  specialized court  to  deal with juvenile delinquency,  child abuse
and neglect,  and other legal  problems of children.  The juvenile  court was freed  from due process
and other constitutional constraints.  Over  time it became  the object of resounding  criticism for the
abuses  of power administered  without  such constraints,  and  modem  reforms  reintroduced  proce-
dural  rights  for children  in juvenile  court.  See  A.  PLATr,  THE  CHILD  SAVERS:  THE  INVENTION  OF
DELINQUENCY  (1969);  E.  RYERSON,  THE  BEST  LAID  PLANS:  AMERICA'S JUVENILE  COURT  EXPERIMENT
(1978).
188.  The parental and state conceptions  of power do not exhaust  the possible forms power may
take,  and the development  of a positive alternative  to traditional  state power that is not modeled  on
the parental  role remains  an  important  intellectual and political  challenge.
189.  For  a contrasting  view  see infra note  210 and accompanying  text.
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between  the  two  conceptions  makes  the  procedural  techniques  for  con-
straining  school  power unlikely  to  solve  the dilemma  that  disobedient  chil-
dren may  be stigmatized  among their peers if singled  out for treatment with
due process or stigmatized  even if not accorded procedural  rights.  This ver-
sion of the difference dilemma arises in the very legal strategy devised to curb
coercive  state  power.  Rather  than  seeking  conceptual  escapes  from  such
dilemmas, we need to learn to live with the tension between differing concepts
of power and the tension between  varying responses  to difference  in the par-
ticular institutional  settings we arrange.  Thinking about such tensions  differ-
ently, however,  can help us learn to live with them, and it is in that spirit that
the article  next  offers  a different  stance toward  the  difference  dilemma.
IV
A  DIFFERENT  STANCE  TOWARD  DIFFERENCE
The dilemma of altering the treatment of "different"  children without reit-
erating  those lines of difference  cannot be avoided  by focusing on the  means
to achieve the end of eliminating stigma, nor by seeking to check the power of
schools  through other institutions or due process  rights.  To the extent that
educators  and policymakers debate the relationship between means and ends,
the problem  of difference  recurs,  and it does not become  more simple.  Fur-
ther,  to  the  extent  that  bilingual  and  special  education  law  and  programs
adopt the legal  solutions  of institutional checks  and  procedural due process,
they  follow  a  well-trodden  route  of legal  problem  solving  in  this  culture.
These solutions, however,  at best forestall  the difference dilemma,  or move it
to another point of decisionmaking  or implementation.  Reimmersion  in  the
dilemma, rather than avoidance of it, can yield a more vivid understanding.  In
offering  a reexamination,  a different  stance toward  the difference  dilemma  is
suggested  here, not  with  the hope of solution,  but with  the  hope of a  more
productive  struggle.
A.  Restating the Dilemma
The  dilemma of difference  is  the risk of reiterating the stigma  associated
with  assigned  difference  either  by focusing on it or by  ignoring it.  Both  the
handicapped child and the non-English-proficient  child may be stigmatized by
segregated or specialized  schooling based on their perceived  differences  from
other students;  yet not acknowledging  their  differences,  and not developing
programs  for their needs, may make their differences  continue to matter  and
mark them apart,  in both identity and  accomplishment,  from other students.
There are  several dimensions of this dilemma, however, that contribute to its
construction but have not come  to light thus far.
First,  the  connections  between  difference  and  stigma,  on  the  one  hand,
and sameness and equality on the other, must be unearthed.  Indeed, equality
itself can be understood  as founded on the belief that people  are fundamen-
tally the same  or interchangeable.  As J.R.  Pole has  explained, constitutional
notions of equality in America  rest on the idea that people are equal because
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they could all take each others'  places in work, intellectual exchange,  or polit-
ical  power  if  they  were  dissociated  from  their  contexts  of family,  religion,
class, or race, and if they had the same opportunities and experiences.19 0  The
problem with this concept of equality is that it makes the recognition of differ-
ences  a threat to the premise behind equality.  If to be equal you must be the
same, then to be different is to be unequal.  Indeed, as some have noted, to be
different is to be deviant.' 9 1  In view of the risk that difference will mean devi-
ance  or inequality,  stigmatization  from identified  difference  is not surprising.
Nor  is  it  surprising  that  stigmatization  results  from  differences  which  are
denied  or ignored (but reappears for the child perceived  as different from  his
or her peers) or for the child who is  tested as  different by testing instruments
designed  without taking his or her characteristics  into account.
This concept of equality, which  links equality and sameness, and inequality
and  difference,  is  also  unsatisfactory  because  it obscures  the  possibility  that
equality  can  apply  to  people  who  are  different-with  their  differences
acknowledged-and  thereby  obviates  the  need  to  relate  across  differences,
rather  than  through  the  myth  of interchangeability  or  sameness.' 9 2  At  the
same time, the connection between inequality  and difference  treats the partic-
ular categories of difference used to assign positions of equality and inequality
as  permanent,  and,  indeed,  treats  people as  subject to  categorization  rather
than as  manifesting multitudes  of characteristics.19 3  Categories  that  take the
form of dichotomies-same  and different, normal  and handicapped,  English
proficient  and  not  English  proficient-especially  obscure  the  variety  and
range  of characteristics  that more aptly  describe experience.
The  tendency  to  construct  simplifying  categories  to  make  sense  of the
190.  J.  POLE,  THE  PURSUIT  OF  EQUALITY  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY  293-94  (1978).  An  influential
version  of this view appears in the work of John Rawls,  who posits the hypothetical original position,
in  which  individuals  abstracted  from  actual  identities  and  situations  choose  from  a  position  of
equality  the first principle  of justice.  SeeJ. RAWLS,  A  THEORY  OF JUSTICE  12-13  (1974); see also id. at
72-74,  123-24  (individuals to be treated as equal because luck, not desert, explains  differences).  The
notion  of  the  self, freed  from  differentiating  circumstances,  experiences,  and  involvements  with
others, has  come  under recent criticism from many quarters.  See J. ELSHTAIN,  PUBLIC  MAN,  PRIVATE
WOMAN  344-45  (198 1)(analysis  of class  rather than individualism may produce equality);  M.  SANDEL,
LIBERALISM  AND  THE LIMITS  OF JUSTICE  171-74  (1982)  (self is constituted in  part by  family and  com-
munity  membership);  M.  WALZER,  SPHERES  OF JUSTICE  255-62,  271-80  (1983)  (criticizing Rawls).
191.  Gilligan,  In a Different Voice:  Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality, 47  HARV.  EDUC.  REV.
481,  482 (1977);  A.  LORDE,  Age,  Race, Class and Sex:  Women  Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER:
ESSAYS  AND  SPEECHES  114,  116 (1984).
192.  Some recent psychological work identifies  the theory of personality development  as a root
to this  problem of equality and difference.  In particular, the development  of the child's sense of self
in  opposition  to  the mother  has  undergirded earlier studies  of personality  development,  and  sup-
ported an  idea  of individual  identity  as  preoccupied  with  differentiation  from the  mother.  See  N.
CHODORow,  THE  REPRODUCTION  OF  MOTHERING;  PSYCHOANALYSIS  AND  THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  GENDER
67-91,  99-129  (1978);  Chodorow,  Gender, Relation, and Difference in Psychoanlaytic Perspective, in  THE
FUTURE  OF  DIFFERENCE, supra note 6, at 3,  7-8,  13;  Benjamin,  The Bonds of Love:  Rational Violence and
Erotic Domination, in  THE  FUTURE  OF  DIFFERENCE,  supra note  6, at  41,  46-47.  A  promising  line  of
inquiry  would  explore  how  the  sameness  supporting  equality  could  be  understood  as  each  indi-
vidual's  potential  to  differ  from  others,  and  indeed,  to  differ  from  earlier  versions  of himself or
herself.
193.  See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE  OF PREJUDICE  19-27  (1958)  (prejudice founded on categorical
thinking and  overgeneralization).
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complicated  world  may  well  be  inevitable, 94  but  treating  the  categories  as
though they existed and as though they defined a person's identity and worth
is  another  matter.  Treating  the  individual  as  handicapped  or  English-lan-
guage  deficient  runs  the  risk  of assigning  to  that  individual,  as  an  internal
limit, the category of difference that carries the message of inequality. 195  This
is not inevitable,  for the categories  of handicap  and language  proficiency  are
not the sum total of those  individuals,  nor are  they indications  of those indi-
viduals'  potential  or worth.  Stephen Jay Gould  put it this way:
Few  tragedies  can be  more  extensive  than the  stunting of life,  few injustices  deeper
than  the  denial  of opportunity  to  strive  or  even  to  hope,  by  a  limit imposed  from
without, but falsely identified  as lying  within.  . . . We inhabit  a world  of human dif-
ferences  and  predilections,  but  the  extrapolation  of these  facts  to  theories  of rigid
limits  is  ideology.
19 6
Ideology is the concern here because expressions of power, approval and dis-
approval  are  at work  in  the links  between categories  of sameness  and  differ-
ence  and the values  of equality and  inequality.
A second dimension of the difference problem emerges  from the following
conception of equality and difference:  for there to be an assignment  of devi-
ancy,  it must be from the vantage  point of some claimed normality;  for there
to  be  a  position  of inequality,  there  must  be  a contrasting  position,  not  of
equality,  but of superiority.  In short,  the idea of difference  depends  on the
establishment  of a  relationship  between  the  one assigned  the  label  of "dif-
ferent"  and the one used as the counterexample.' 97  Once noted as a concept
forged  in relationship,  difference  no longer  belongs  to the  one  child who  is
called  "different,"  but instead  to  the  relationship  between  the  two  children
under  comparison.  They  are  both  different  from  each  other, whatever  the
proficiencies  or deficiencies  used  to characterize  each.
Two  insights  can  be  drawn from  this  notion  of difference  as dependent
upon or created by a relationship.  First, there is no "normal"  person or posi-
tion which is itself free from being different:  even as a hearing-disabled  child
is  defined as  different in terms of the  child without hearing impairments,  the
194.  See Bruner, Art as a Mode of Knowing, in ON  KNOWING;  ESSAYS  FOR THE  LEFT  HAND  59,  69
(1979):
There  is,  perhaps,  one universal  truth about all  forms of human  cognition:  the ability  to  deal
with knowledge  is hugely exceeded by the potential knowledge contained in man's environment.
To  cope  with  this  diversity,  man's  perception,  his  memory,  and  his  thought  processes  early
become  governed by  strategies for protecting his limited capacities from  the confusion of over-
loading.  We tend  to  perceive  things  schematically,  for example,  rather  than  in  detail,  or  we
represent a class  of diverse things  by some  sort of averaged  'typical  instance.'
Id.
195.  The flexible, individualized  approach to special  education  embodied in the  individualized
education plan required by the EAHCA  helps to  identify the variety of deficits and strengths of each
child, but the placement  process used by the school may  recreate categorical treatment,  given limits
on the school's placement  options.  See supra note  145 and  accompanying  text.
196.  S.  GOULD,  supra note  128,  at 28-29.
197.  Psychological theories that locate the development  of personality  link the construction  of a
separate  identity within  the  relationship  between  parents  and  child,  which has  its  own  dynamic  of
power.  See E. BECKER,  THE BIRTH  AND  DEATH  OF  MEANING  21-53 (1971);  N.  CHODOROW,  supra note
192;  R. KEGAN,  THE  EVOLVING  SELF 76-110  (1982);  Winnicott, Mirror-role  of Mother and Family in Child
Development, in PLAYING  AND  REALITY  130  (1982).
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latter  child  is  also  a  "different"  child,  different  from  the  hearing-impaired
child. 1 9 8  Both children are situated within  a matrix of difference which we use
to describe  them;  their  relationship  constructs  what we  mean  by  difference.
Indeed, the  "normal"  child depends on the existence of the "different"  child
for  the  label  of normal;  it  is  the  relationship,  again,  that  constructs  the
difference. ' 9 9
But  if this point emphasizes  the role of the "normal"  child in  the definition
of difference, the second point emphasizes the participation of the "different"
child in that relationship.  The "different"  child may actively participate in the
construction  and  retention  of the  attributed  difference.  One  educational
researcher  described  an example  of this.  Rosa is  a child  whose  native  lan-
guage  is  Spanish  and  who  is  at  the bottom  of her English  reading  group  in
first grade.  After filming Rosa's interaction  with her teacher  and classmates,
the researcher  concluded  that  Rosa
conspires with  the teacher in not getting a turn  to read.  Although  she often requests
a  turn  to read,  she  does so  in unusual ways:  she checks  to see what pages  the other
children  are reading, turns to a  different page, and then calls  for a turn; she waits for
the teacher  to  start to  call  on another  child and  then  quickly calls for  a  turn;  or she
calls  for a  turn  while looking  away from the  teacher.  . . . The teacher  organizes  the
turn taking in the group randomly,  so that Rosa never has to  be asked  to read as she
would  if the teacher  called  on children  in order around  the table  . . . . Rosa  spends
her  time avoiding a turn  to read.
20 0
The researcher concluded  that
Rosa's actions  make sense when  one considers  her beginning reading skills,  the com-
petitive  pressures  of the classroom,  and  the  teacher's  organizational  methods.  The
teacher's  behavior makes sense given her task-teaching a child to read while keeping
a  whole  roomful  of children  busy  at other  tasks.  Together,  they  behave  sensibly  in
relation  to  each  other  and appear  to  be  doing their  best.  But together  they do  not
achieve  trusting  relations.  Rosa  and  the  teacher  do  not  understand  each  other's
behavior as directed to the best interest of what they are trying to do together, namely,
to get  Rosa organized for learning how  to read.
20 1
This may be an extreme  case of a child's collusion  in  the  construction  of dif-
ference;  it  suggests  her  belief  that  exposing  her  difference  by  seeking  a
reading turn would be more painful than  retaining  that difference.
The difference dilemma, then, depends  on the relationship  constructed  to
define  "different"  and  "normal,"  and  on  the  association  of equality  with
sameness  and of deviance with  difference.  These conceptual associations  are
in  conflict  with  the  mission  of schools,  which  aim  to  help  all  students,  and
which carry an ethos of possibility and future equality for all.  As  noted in  the
discussion of first amendment  issues  in  the schools,  the  commitment  to con-
198.  This  is a  separate point from  the real possibility that this child has still other impairments
or strengths  not relevant  to  the question of hearing.
199.  Hegel's master/slave  discussion  elaborates  this  point:  the  master needs  the  slave  for the
master to be recognized  as master, and therefore  constructs a relationship of dominance and submis-
sion  rather  than  negating or destroying  the  slave.  G.  HEGEL,  PHENOMENOLOGY  OF  SPIRIT  141-50
(1952).
200.  McDermott,  Social Relations as Contexts for Learning in School, in  KNOWLEDGE  AND  VALUES  IN
SOCIAL  AND  EDUCATIONAL  RESEARCH  252,  257-58  (E.  Bredo  & W.  Feinberg eds.  1982).
201.  Id.
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sider all children as potential participants in the adult community, however far
from that they  currently  may  seem, challenges  the  association  of the  child's
difference from the adult with deviance,  and urges efforts  to prepare the child
for adulthood.  How can this set of values  in schooling survive  the difference
dilemma?  Other  than  describing  as  vividly  as  possible  the  nature  of this
dilemma, what  strategies  for dealing  with it might  reduce the risks  of recre-
ating stigma  by either ignoring or focusing upon it?
B.  Toward  a  Different Stance
Understanding  that  stigma  is  a  likely risk  so long  as  "difference"  means
"deviance"  rather  than  equality  exposes  the  following  problem:  how  can
equality be achieved  given the acknowledgment  of difference?  In a sense, this
is  the problem  buried  within the difference  dilemma:  the fear  of reiterating
difference,  whether  by  acknowledgment  or  nonacknowledgement,  arises  as
long as difference  carries  stigma and precludes  equality.  Locating  difference
in the relationship rather  than in the person  or group called  "different"  may
permit a new stance toward the problem of stigma.  Focusing  on the relation-
ship or matrix  in which  difference  is  created  may offer  people  the chance  to
acknowledge  difference  and not locate it in another who  then is unequal, but
instead in the relationship used to define that "difference."  More simply, this
set  of rather  abstract arguments  can justify looking at  the problem  of differ-
ence as a shared problem of relationships and contexts-a problem requiring
a collaborative  solution to change  the very matrix of difference.  The goal is
not to pretend that differences  are not noticed, nor that  all students  are the
same,  nor to  focus  on the students  who are  "different"  as  the problem,  but
instead  to  identify  as  the  problem  the  shared  context  in  which  difference
appears.  The dilemma  of difference  will  not disappear, but struggles  with it
may prove more fruitful from this shifted stance toward the shared problem of
difference.
202
C.  Some Examples  and Some  Continuing Problems
1.  Parents of  Special  Education  Students.  An  initial  example  of  a  school
system's  shift  in  stance  on  the issue of difference  appears  in Joel  Handler's
study of special  education in Madison, Wisconsin. 2 0 3  The focus in this study
is on the parents of students in special education,  rather than on the students
themselves.  Parents  of children  with  special  needs  can be  made  to  feel  dif-
ferent  from  other  parents,  at  odds  with  the  school  and  obstacles  in  the
202.  Who shares the power to make decisions about educational programs  which  deal with  dif-
ference is bound to be an issue.  If decisional power is  held only by people who assign the difference
problem to others, who have  no decisional power, a shift in stance  is  unlikely.  This article does not
address who should be included in the planning decisions or in the definitions  of the problems  to be
addressed  by  those decisions,  but it  may  be important  to  include in  educational  planning  teachers
and administrators,  parents, and students  who  "have"  the characteristics  of "difference"  to give  the
planners  themselves  the  chance  to  grapple  with  their  own  involvement  in  the  construction  of
difference.
203.  J.  HANDLER,  supra note  134,  ch. 4.
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school's response to their children, and stigmatized for having failed or other-
wise  earned  blame.  But  parents  with  children  in  the  Madison  program
describe  a  different  experience.  Handler  explains  that  the culture  and  ide-
ology of the Madison program made special education part of general educa-
tion,  and  special  education  services  part  of a  continuum  of all  educational
services.20 4  Also,  because all  parents are treated as  an important  part of reg-
ular education,  parents whose children  receive  special education  services  are
also considered to have important roles in their children's education.  As one
school administrator reported, " 'Parents  with handicapped  children are made
more  like  other  parents  rather  than  being differentiated.  Parents  and  kids
build  their  identity  first  as  members  of the  school  district  rather  than  as  a
handicapped  child or a parent of a handicapped  child.'  "205  By including par-
ents  early on in  the planning process  for their child's  special  education  pro-
gram,  the  parents  develop  a  stake  in  the  outcome.2 0 6  Even  with  the
framework  of  due  process  rights  and  potential  adversarial  hearings,  the
school's  stance  brings  the parents  on  the  same  side  of the  problem  as  the
school; both are  part of the  solution.
However, there are real shortcomings with this approach:  parents may be
co-opted or moved to a position of passivity  in the face of the school's attitude
and  expertise.20 7  Further,  community  attitudes  stigmatizing  students  may
well  remain  untouched.  Again,  this  example  concerns  only  the treatment  of
parents  of students  in  special  education;  when  the  students  themselves  are
involved,  a  shift in stance  must somehow locate  all the  students  on the same
side of the  problem,  as part of the solution.
2.  A  Classroom and a  Hearing-Impaired  Student.  Imagine  a  teacher  facing  a
mainstream  second  grade  class  which  included  a  severely  hearing-impaired
child like Amy Rowley.  Initially,  the choices seem  to  be to obtain a full-time
sign language  interpreter  in  the mainstream  classroom  or  simply  to include
Amy  in  the  regular  classroom  instruction,  supplemented  by  some  separate
instruction for her during part of the  day.20 8  Both of these approaches  treat
the  problem  of  difference  as  located  in  the  hearing-impaired  child,  and
equality  as  conditioned  on  sameness.  Either  a  special  instructor  has  to  be
secured just for her, or else she is  to be treated  for the most part just like any
other student.  Any  special  treatment  again  singles  her out,  reiterating  the
assignment  of difference  to  Amy.  A  different  stance  toward  the  problem
would  conceive  of all  the  students  as  part  of the  problem.  The  individual
teacher  would  ask herself what  approach  to  the  problem  would  work  to  the
educational  benefit  of every  student in the  classroom.
204.  Id. at  21.
205.  Id. at 22.  How children actually  feel  is not examined  in detail  in  the study.
206.  Id. at 36.
207.  Id. at 63-64,  79.
208.  See supra notes  135-43  and accompanying  text  (discussing Board of Educ. v.  Rowley,  458
U.S.  176  (1982)).  Another option  would  be  to  send  the child  to  a class  specially  for the hearing-
impaired.  Cost factors  may, of course, operate quite powerfully in the assessment of the alternatives.
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One approach she might take would be to instruct all the students  in sign
language, and run the class in both spoken and sign language simultaneously.
This approach  would engage all  the  students  in  the difficult  and educational
issues  of how to  communicate  across  traditional  lines  of difference,  how  to
struggle with the difficulties of translation,  how to understand all  language as
arrangements  of signs,  how to employ group  action to improve  the situation
of an individual, and how to turn the authority of the teacher into the compas-
sion  of the  group.  This  approach  affords  a  different  stance  toward  the
dilemma  of difference:  making  the  hearing-impaired  child's  difference  no
longer signify stigma or isolation while still responding to that difference as an
issue for  the entire  community.  It also  could  bring  the means  of education
close  to  the  ends  of individual  and  community  responsibility  for  problem
solving  and  enhanced  individual  knowledge.  This  solution also  involves  the
exercise of school power  in  a way  which  resembles  love  while achieving  the
legal demands  of equal  treatment.
Again, this example is hardly a model for all classrooms,  or even for many.
There  is  no  promise  that  the  non-hearing-impaired  students  will  happily
respond to this approach,  or that their parents  will not reject it as a waste  of
their children's time. 20 9  Moreover, an analogous approach to bilingual educa-
tion,  such  as  having  each  child  learn  the  languages  other  children  use  at
home, would be unwieldy and likely to provoke massive opposition.  Nonethe-
less,  the  learning  value  of the  experience  for  all  the  children  could  be
defended.  Struggling to be understood  in a language that feels foreign would
provide  an important  lesson  to each  child about  their  shared  problems  and
about the abilities and disabilities of each student.  Once located, the problem
of difference  in  this  shared  context  could  alleviate  the risk of stigma,  while
deepening  each child's  sense of what it means  to live  in a  social  world.
An  analogous  stance  toward  the  problem  of the  unmanageable  child
already  contributes  to  educational  programs.  The  unmanageable  child  can
disrupt  an  entire  class,  but rather  than  simply  placing  the  child  in  isolation
outside the classroom, one alternative  is to pair two teachers who may send an
unmanageable  child to each other's classroom.  Significantly, the procedure is
introduced  to the entire class in a group discussion so that the defiant  child is
not singled  out, and  when  that child returns  to  the original  classroom,
the  excluding teacher  reviews  the  situation  with  her  class,  emphasizing  the  reasons
behind the relevant rules and alternative  ways  in which  the excluded  child might  have
acted.  Whenever possible her remarks are channeled  into a group discussion that can
be used  to marshal the support of the class in helping the excluded  child.  Once chil-
dren have expressed  their expected bitterness  toward the defiant  child  in such discus-
sions,  the  teacher  can  elicit  more  sympathetic  interest  from  them  in  helping  him,
209.  The identification  of many  different  kinds  of special  needs  expressed  by  other  students
could complicate the program considerably.  How  would a blind or a cerebral palsied student partici-
pate?  Yet these and  other practical problems could be worked  out within  a specific school  context.
After  this article  was  written,  it  came to the author's  attention  that a  local school  responded  to the
enrollment  of a hearing-impaired  child  with sign language  instruction  for classmates,  much like  the
suggestion  made  here.  Telephone  communication  with  Clare  Dalton  (Dec.  16,  1984)  (describing
Cambridge  Friends  School).
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especially  when  she  points  out  that  she  needs  help  from  the  class  in  teaching  the
excluded  child  to follow class  rules.
2 1 0
Here, too, the entire class is  included in the problem  as well  as another class.
The issue of discipline itself becomes  an educational  process  involving all of
the students.  The problem, then, is not located solely in the "different"  child,
but in the demands of the society of the classroom for managing behavior and
following  rules.
3.  Schooling, Not  Schools.  At  a  more  macro  level,  another  kind  of inquiry
would  pursue  the  features  of schooling  that  could  be  altered  to  ease  the
dilemma of difference.  One such feature  is the  confinement of the schooling
process  to  a  given  school setting.211  This feature  exacerbates  the difference
dilemma  by  making the  removal of any individual  child from the established
school  setting  carry  stigmatizing  and  isolating  consequences.  Because  that
child  is  treated  differently  from  other children,  the  association  of inequality
follows,  and  the  "difference"  is  deposited  on  the  child  rather  than  on  the
school  setting itself.
Consider as an alternative the creation of supplemental schooling environ-
ments  so  that  students  spend  different  days  or portions  of different  days  in
different settings,  with different  mixes of children  and teachers.  Experiments
of this nature may be costly or difficult to administer.  The idea is worth some
attention,  however,  because  at least it provides  a different  stance toward  the
difference  dilemma  in  bilingual  and  special  education.  Making  "pull-outs"
and movement  in and out of the standard classroom  the norm rather than the
exception could  cut the link  between stigmatizing difference and  special edu-
cational programming.  No student or subset of students would be considered
"different"  simply  because  of classes  or programs  outside  the regular  class-
room;  the  regular  classroom  itself  would  cease  to  be  the  "norm"  against
which  "difference"  is  established.  Students  would  undoubtedly  take  little
time  in  establishing  who  is  leaving  the  classroom  for an enrichment  science
class,  and who is  leaving for remedial  speech therapy. 2 12  Nonetheless,  a real
mix  of special  classes  could  modulate  the  implicit  hierarchy  of such  extra
classes,  and  diminish  the  implication  that  difference  resides  in  the  unusual
student rather  than  in all  the  students.
One strategy  would pull each  student out for instruction  in a  language  in
which  he or she  is not proficient-and  make use of that language  instruction
in  the  mainstream  social  studies  class  for  those studying  Spanish  as  well  as
those  studying  English.  This  could  diffuse  the  status  issue  associated  with
each language problem,  and enrich the social  studies  class as  well.  Engaging
210.  S.  SARASON,  THE  CULTURE  OF  THE  SCHOOL  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHANGE  138  (1971)
(quoting  member  of Yale Psycho-Educational  Clinic  who  described  procedure  implemented  in  an
inner-city school).
211.  But see  L.  CREMIN,  AMERICAN  EDUCATION:  THE  NATIONAL  EXPERIENCE  1783-1876  163-71
(1980)  (education  historically  conducted  in  settings  outside  of  schools:  families,  churches,  job
settings).
212.  Cf  S.  LIGHTFOOT,  supra note  133,  at  358  (students  sensitive  to  curricular  divisions  as
expressions  of class hierarchy).
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in  multiple  educational  strategies  could  avoid  the  elevation  of  any  given
means  to the  ends  of schooling.  Diffusing  power through  different  relation-
ships within the life of the school, rather than through different governmental
power centers  directing  school programs,  could  provide  openings  for more




The dilemma of difference  is unlikely  to disappear in the near future.  The
patterns  of debate and legal response to the dilemma fail to uncover the ways
in which difference  is created in relationships and inequality is associated with
difference.  The  choice  between  programs  that  create  enclaves  of bilingual
and  special  education  and  programs  that  create  a  microcosm  of the  larger
community in each classroom does not offer a way out of the dilemma.  Devel-
oping methods to check school power through institutional review or through
due  process  similarly does not resolve the  problem.  This  article has  tried to
describe  the  hold  that  the  difference  dilemma  seems  to  have  in  legal  and
policy  debates  over bilingual and  special education.  In part, this  explicit  and
at  times  anecdotal  depiction  of the  dilemma  is  intended  to  make  it  more
apparent, and  less likely to catch  us unaware.
The  article  has  also  suggested  an  alternate  stance  toward  the  problem.
This  different  stance  locates  the  problem  of difference  in  the relationships
that define it, and  the problem  of stigma in  the association  of sameness with
equality and of difference  with inequality.  This stance bears a resemblance  to
the  new  stances  developed  by  philosophers  of science  and  social  science
toward the problem of knowledge.  There,  too, the problem of difference  has
been highlighted, but in the form of the distinction between  the observer and
the  observed.  The  scientist-observer,  according  to  recent  theorists,  is  not
separate nor totally different from the  subject under observation,  but partici-
pates  in  the  creation  of knowledge  and  in  the  construction  of what  is  to be
known.21 3  Similar ideas animate developments  in psychology.  Not only is the
relationship  between  the therapist  and  the client  a focus  for psychotherapy,
each individual's  construction of relationships  to her or his social  world  and
the interactions  that occur is attended to by psychology.  The development of
213.  R.  BERNSTEIN,  BEYOND  OBJECTIVISM  AND  RELATIVISM:  SCIENCE,  HERMENEUTICS,  AND  PRAXIS
71-108 (1983)  (role of choice  and judgment in  scientific knowledge,  challenging distinction between
objectivity  and  relativism);  S.  LIGHTFOOT,  supra note  133,  at  376-78  (researcher  using portraiture
exchanges  and engages  with the subject,  and directly touches them);  M.  POLANYI,  PERSONAL  KNOWL-
EDGE:  TOWARDS  A POST-CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY  (1958)  (tacit participation of observer in  knowledge);
C. WILSON,  THE NEW  EXISTENTIALISM  39, 49 (1966)  (phenomenology rejects positivism's assumption
that the mind  can be taken for granted in  the study  of the world); Flax, Mother-Daughter  Relationships:
Psychodynamics, Politics, and Philosophy, in  THE  FUTURE  OF  DIFFERENCE  20,  21  (1980)  (criticizing view
from  "empiricism  and  many forms  of rationalism,  the  subject  is  considered  totally  different,  sub-
stance and process, from  the object"); Taylor, Interpretation  and the Science of Man, in KNOWLEDGE  AND
VALUES  IN  SOCIAL  AND  EDUCATIONAL  RESEARCH  153,  177-78  (1982)  (subjective meanings  and shared
meanings  constitute study, not just brute facts).
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categories  to explain mental disturbances  is linked to the development of cat-
egories  to explain "normal"  development, and the  potential for both normal
and abnormal  development,  for anyone,  is  the basic  message. 214
Each  of these  intellectual  moves  may  carry  real  consequences  for  moral
conduct,  for  they  each  speak  to  the  problem  of  how  one  person  should
approach another.  As  Walter Kaufman  put it:
Nothing  Freud  has  done,  and  little  that  anyone  else  has  done,  is  more  relevant  to
ethics  than his  success in breaking down  the wall  between  the normal and  abnormal,
the respectable and the criminal, the good and  the evil.  Freud gave, as  it were,  a new
answer  to  the  gospel  query,  "Who  is  my  neighbor?"  The  mentally  troubled,
depressed,  hysterical,  and  insane are  not  possessed  by  the devil  but  essentially  "as
thyself."
2 15
Perhaps  these intellectual  developments  can  sustain  practical  efforts  not  to
escape  the  dilemma of difference,  but to locate  it as the context  for all  chil-
dren,  regardless  of  how  we  adults  may  describe  their  impairments  or
strengths,  cultural  backgrounds  or language  proficiencies.  Perhaps then  we
can  hope  to  act on the  conflicting but sincere  commitments  to the children
involved.
214.  See  M.  EDELSON,  THE  IDEA  OF  A  MENTAL  ILLNESS  105-36  (1971)  (shared  human  symbolic
processes the subject of therapy in relationship between patient and therapist); R. KEGAN, supra note
197,  at  76-110  (the construction  of the  self in  relationship  to  others);  S. MINUCHIN,  FAMILIES  AND
FAMILY  THERAPY  4-15  (1974)  (interaction between individual and social  context is site of pathology
and subject of therapy); Freud, Psychoanalysis, in CHARAcTER  AND  CULTURE  230-52  (P.  Rieff ed.  1963)
(1922  essay describing elements of psychoanalysis).
215.  W.  KAUFMAN,  FROM  SHAKESPEARE  TO  EXISTENTIALIsM:  AN ORIGINAL  STUDY  337  (1960).
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